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Abstract
This paper studies the direct and indirect channels through which offshoring affects the domestic skill-
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offshore workers across tasks.
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11 Introduction
One key feature of the recent globalization trend is the growing phenomenon of international reorganiza-
tion of production and work processes, resulting in offshoring of jobs. This trend has heightened concerns
regarding job and wage cuts in many advanced countries (cf. Bhagwati et al., 2004; Snower et al., 2009).1
When looking at the causes, earlier studies have highlighted the labor market impact of international frag-
mentation of the value added chain, captured by the increasing penetration of intermediate goods (Feenstra
and Hanson, 1996, 1999; Jones and Kierzkowski, 1990, 2001; Kohler, 2004a,b). More recent observations ac-
centuate the important role of job characteristics and task content of occupations in global competition (cf.
Blinder, 2009a,b). To put it in the words of Blinder (2009b, p.54), “. . . this time it’s not the British who are
coming, but the Indians. . . neither by land nor by sea, but electronically”.
The rationale behind this new trend can be found in various factors: on the one hand, the integration
process of national markets into a global market has been accelerated by advances in information and com-
munication technology (ICT) as well as by declines in trade transaction and transportation costs of goods
and services. On the other hand, rapid economic growth in major emerging countries, such as Brazil, Rus-
sia, India, and China (BRIC), has been characterized by high accumulation of human capital and advanced
technologies as well as by improvements in the economic and business infrastructure. As a consequence
the emerging countries have become highly competitive in areas such as information technology services in
which the advanced countries have been dominant (Bhagwati et al., 2004; Snower et al., 2009; Spence, 2011).
These developments have reduced the locational viability of some occupations. In particular jobs with a
high content of routine, non-interactive, and non-cognitive tasks can be easily codified, enabling firms in
many advanced countries to reorganize production and work processes. This reorganization implies that
the various stages of production are geographically decomposed into clusters of tasks and each task cluster
is located in the country where it is most profitable (Snower et al., 2009). Therefore the comparative advan-
tage of performing specific tasks in occupations has become important.
The empirical evidence has highlighted how global competition led to offshoring of routine-intensive
tasks and identified offshoring as one of the key sources of recent polarizing developments in employment
and wages observed in many advanced countries.2 However, the link between offshoring-induced changes
in task structure, on the one hand, and skill-wage structure and unemployment, on the other hand, is rather
implicit in most of the literature. In our perception a fruitful approach is to make this link more explicit
1Blinder (2009a) estimates that 30 million to 40 million jobs in the USA are potentially offshorable, while job tasks that require face-
to-face contact as well as abstract and cognitive skills are protected. See also the studies by Jensen and Kletzer (2010) and Moncarz
et al. (2008) regarding offshorability of service occupations. For example, Moncarz et al. (2008) identify the offshorability of 160 service
occupations, where the range of occupations includes scientists, mathematicians, radiologists and editors at the high end of the market
as well as those of telephone operators, clerks and typists at the low end.
2For recent empirical evidence regarding the polarization effect in the US labor market see Autor et al. (2003); Autor and Dorn (2009,
2013); Autor et al. (2006, 2008); Firpo et al. (2011); Michaels et al. (2014); and in the European labor markets Baumgarten et al. (2013);
Dustmann et al. (2009); Goos and Manning (2007); Goos et al. (2009, 2014); Spitz-Oener (2006).
2Figure 1: Predicted distribution of offshorability of occuptations in the U.S., by skill intensity
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Notes: The figure plots the predicted fit along with the 95% confidence interval of the mean from the
fractional-polynomial estimation of the adjusted offshorability index of 290 occupations in the US. For a
detailed description of data, see Appendix A.
by identifying skills as a unique characteristic of workers. Skills then can be directly related to wages and
unemployment as is often done in the empirical literature (cf. Acemoglu and Autor, 2011).
We illustrate this point by presenting an important stylized fact regarding the nature of offshoring oc-
cupations in Figure 1. Using data for the U.S., we plot the predicted distribution of 290 occupations by the
degree of offshorability and the skill intensity. The resulting relation highlights that occupations with lowest
and highest skill-intensity are currently less prone to offshoring, while occupations in the middle range of
the skill-intensity reflect a substantial degree of offshorability. For instance, medium skill-intensive occupa-
tions are bookkeeping, accounting, billing and posting clerks and machine operators with an average share
of medium-skill workers of about 82 percent. Low skill-intensive occupations are such as textile winding,
machine operators and tenders and high skill-intensive occupations are, for example, economists, lawyers,
medical and physical scientist.
The empirical literature has adequately addressed the direct wage and employment implications of off-
shoring for the domestic workforce, emphasizing that despite a displacement effect due to job reallocation
abroad, offshoring may induce a potential countervailing productivity effect due to cost savings on offshored
inputs (tasks). However, we are still lacking an understanding of the underlying general equilibrium mech-
anisms behind the offshoring-induced trends in the labor market. More specifically, the existing studies
have ignored determinants of underlying channels of offshoring-induced internal skill-task reallocation ef-
fects for skill groups who are not immediately affected by offshoring. Recent empirical evidence shows that
3offshoring may induce an occupational mobility by displaced workers, usually from routine-intensive occu-
pations to occupations with high intensity in manual and cognitive tasks (cf. Cortes et al., 2016).
Therefore, the objective of this paper is to improve our understanding regarding the underlying driving
forces behind these indirect channels. We develop a theoretical model that identifies various mechanisms
through which offshoring affects the labor market conditions of different skill groups in the home country.
Our model includes four types of workers, consisting of low-, medium-, and high-skill workers in the home
country and offshore workers abroad. Each type of workers performs a range of tasks that are combined by a
CES-aggregate to produce a final consumption good. Workers are heterogeneous with respect to their com-
parative advantage to perform tasks, while offshoring is additionally subject to variable transaction costs.
In line with the evidence discussed above, offshoring activities are by assumption limited to medium skill-
intensive tasks. We also allow for equilibrium unemployment that can be explained in two alternative ways.
A first explanation of equilibrium unemployment is that the low-skill labor market segment is characterized
by a minimum wage scheme above the market clearing wage rate. As an alternative explanation we consider
a more general case of labor market friction where low-skill labor market is now characterized by an elastic
wage curve. The latter explanation enables us to account for adjustments of both demand and supply sides
of the labor market.
The results of the analysis show that easier offshoring affects the skill-wage structure in the home country
through three channels. First, easier offshoring of medium skill-intensive tasks leads to an increase in the
range of offshored tasks and reduces the range of tasks produced by medium-skill workers at home. This
is the direct displacement effect of offshoring at the extensive margin. However, a potential countervailing
impact is that easier offshoring reduces the overall marginal cost of factor labor at home as a result of lower
transaction costs. This is the productivity effect of offshoring at the intensive margin. The third effect is
an internal skill-task reallocation effect of offshoring-induced displaced medium-skill workers to low and
high skill-intensive tasks. Finally, our analysis shows that a reduction in offshoring costs of medium skill-
intensive tasks leads to a specialization of the domestic economy in low and high skill-intensive tasks in a
Walrasian labor market. However, with equilibrium unemployment in the low-skill labor market segment,
characterized by a wage-setting curve, the specialization effect becomes ambiguous and depends on the
elasticity of the wage curve.
We show that the relative magnitude between the direct displacement effect and the productivity effect
depends on the degree of the internal skill-task reallocation and the external relocation of tasks abroad.
The net effect depends on the elasticity of task productivity schedules, i.e. the extent of the comparative
advantage, of workers at the extensive task margins, indicating how easily different type of workers can be
replaced across tasks. Allowing for unemployment in the low-skill labor market segment, the internal skill-
task reallocation effect emphasizes again the role of the elasticity of task productivity schedules between low-
4skill and medium-skill workers across tasks. For a sufficiently high elasticity of task productivity schedules
between low-skill and medium-skill workers lower offshoring costs induce a decline in the unemployment
rate of low-skill workers.
Moreover, our results suggest that the direction of the productivity effect depends on the elasticity of
substitution between tasks. Whenever there is a sufficient degree of complementarity between tasks, easier
offshoring generates a positive impact on wages and employment for the workforce at home through the
productivity effect. Hence, our results highlight that the impact of offshoring will depend importantly on the
elasticity of task productivity schedules of different type of workers, as well as on the elasticity of substitution
between the tasks, indicating the complementarity between offshored and domestic tasks. These key deter-
minants provide new insights regarding the underlying mechanism behind the direct and indirect effects of
offshoring.
In summary, our key contribution is to identify several important channels and their underlying determi-
nants through which offshoring affects the domestic labor market. In particular, it identifies four channels
which are crucial in determining the immediate and indirect effects of offshoring on employment and wages:
On the one hand, the elasticity of task productivity schedules (indicating the relative comparative advan-
tage) between medium-skill and low-skill worker, between offshore and medium-skill workers, and between
high-skill and medium-skill workers. These elasticities capture the notion of how different type of workers
are substitutable across the range of tasks. On the other hand, the elasticity of substitution between domestic
and offshored tasks, which accounts for importance of production technology. These parameters are crucial
in determining the immediate and indirect effects of offshoring on employment and wages. Moreover, these
new insights can guide the empirical research by providing rationales why, for instance, the magnitude and
the incidence of labor market polarization have been different between the advanced countries over the past
recent decades.
The paper is organized as follows. The following section briefly reviews the related studies. In section
3 we introduce our theoretical model, while in sections 4 and 5 we discuss our main results regarding the
impact of offshoring and internal skill-task reallocation on the domestic skill-wages structure and low-skill
unemployment, respectively. Finally, section 6 offers concluding remarks.
2 Literature Review
Our theoretical approach is related to the workhorse trade-in-task models of Acemoglu and Autor (2011)
and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). While Acemoglu and Autor (2011) highlight the importance of
skill heterogeneity to account for recent wage polarizing trends in advanced countries, Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2008) show that offshoring-induced displacement effects may be mitigated by a productivity ef-
5fect due to production cost savings.3 However, by assuming a Cobb-Douglas or Leontief production technol-
ogy (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008, respectively) both approaches ignore
the important role of the elasticity of substitution between tasks. For that reason, we merge and augment
these models by developing a framework that accounts for endogenous offshoring and skill heterogeneity
combined in a CES production function with continuum of tasks. We show how the elasticity of substitution
between offshored and domestic tasks and the elasticity of task productivity schedules between domestic
skill groups across tasks has an important impact on the labor market outcomes of offshoring. Moreover,
the potential productivity effect is now characterized by the interaction between an endogenous allocation
of domestic skill groups across tasks (internal skill-task reallocation), and offshorability of domestic tasks
(external task relocation). We show that the magnitude of this interaction crucially depends on the elasticity
of task productivity schedules between domestic and offshore workers across tasks. In addition, our model
can be extended to include equilibrium unemployment. These features are absent in Acemoglu and Autor
(2011) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008).
Two related recent papers by Egger et al. (2015) and Groizard et al. (2014) study the implications of off-
shoring in a model with firm heterogeneity á la Meltiz (2003). Egger et al. (2015) focus mostly on the implica-
tions of offshoring on income inequality, particularly between entrepreneurs and production workers. The
key finding of their analysis highlights the non-monotonic relationship between offshoring costs and a dis-
tributional effect, where high offshoring costs induce more firms into less productive sectors. This, in turn,
redirects the production workers into these low-productivity firms, leading to higher inequality between
production workers and entrepreneurs, and vice versa.
Groizard et al. (2014) focus instead on the impact of offshoring on unemployment. The results of their
analysis highlight the importance of the elasticity of substitution between inputs and its interaction with the
elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods and the elasticity of demand in determining the impact
of offshoring on intrafirm and intrasectoral employment. Similar to the offshoring implication in our model,
they show that higher degree of complementarity between offshore inputs and domestic jobs induces a net
job creation due to the productivity effect. However, none of these models account for skill heterogeneity
and thus ignore the implications of offshoring on the domestic skill-wage structure, next to unemployment
effects. Our model highlights another important channel: the extent of comparative advantage of workers
regarding task performance.
There is a growing number of empirical studies providing evidence on the nature of offshoring domestic
jobs, such as the task-content of occupations, and its labor market implication for the domestic workforce,
suggesting a negative effect for workers in occupations with high content of repetitive, routine tasks (Becker
3A third channel, as put forward in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), is via the terms-of-trade effect that may wipe out the
productivity effect. However, see Bhagwati et al. (2004) for a discussion regarding the empirical insignificance of terms-of-trade effects
of offshoring.
6et al., 2013; Baumgarten et al., 2013; Ebenstein et al., 2014; Hummels et al., 2014; Olney, 2012; Ottaviano
et al., 2013; Wright, 2014). Related to our paper, two recent studies have tested empirically the consequences
of offshoring-induced occupational mobility, suggesting that switching occupations is a costly action for
offshoring-displaced workers. Using matched worker-firm data from Denmark, Hummels et al. (2014) find
that offshoring increases the skill premium within firms, i.e. the relative wage of skilled workers, and that
the downward wage pressure is more pronounced in occupations that involve routine tasks. However, by
allowing for labor mobility across occupations, they find that the cohort-average wage loss (i.e. of workers
who leave the firm, and those who stay) is exacerbated for both low- and high-skill workers. The authors
relate the latter outcome to losses in specific human capital and search costs that considerably hinder the
reattachment to the labor market for the offshoring-induced displaced workers. However, Hummels et al.
(2014) only distinguish between low-skill and high-skill workers and therefore do not observe polarization.
Ebenstein et al. (2014) investigate the impact of trade and offshoring on wages for the USA. Their empiri-
cal findings show that import penetration and offshoring induce a downward pressure for workers perform-
ing routine intensive occupations, while export activities have a positive impact. Moreover, the empirical
evidence emphasizes that the negative wage effect becomes substantial once occupation-sector mobility of
workers is taken into account, suggesting the important role of occupation-specific human capital. Our the-
oretical framework contributes also to the empirical literature by providing a structural guidance regarding
the underlying mechanisms behind the occupational mobility of displaced workers. We show that the elas-
ticity of task productivity schedules between different skill groups is the critical parameter that accounts for
the magnitude of internal skill-task reallocation. Moreover, our analysis also provides new insight on how
this internal skill-task reallocation effects shape the labor market outcomes for other skill groups, especially
low-skill workers, who are not directly affected by offshoring.
To sum up, the set-up of our model is rich enough to highlight various important adjustment mechanisms
through which the domestic labor market absorbs the offshoring shock. We therefore augment the existing
literature by providing new insights regarding the determinants of direct and indirect channels of offshoring
affecting the domestic skill-wage structure and employment opportunities.
3 Model
We consider a small open economy consisting of an aggregate output that is produced under diminishing
returns to scale and perfect competition using a task composite input. The task composite, in turn, consists
of a continuum of tasks that are performed by different types of workers, domestic workers, and offshore
workers. The domestic workers can be distinguished in low-, medium-, and high-skill groups, while offshore
workers are homogeneous regarding their skills. However, in line with the stylized facts discussed earlier, we
7assume that offshore workers compete on tasks concentrated in the middle range of the task distribution.
These are tasks that are performed mainly by domestic medium-skill workers. Below, we outline the frame-
work and discuss the equilibrium conditions, while all formal proofs are relegated to the Supplementary
Mathematical Appendix B.
3.1 Production technology
Aggregate output, Y , is produced according to the following Cobb-Douglas technology function:4
Y = BE1−α, α ∈ (0, 1), (1)
whereB is a positive parameter5, α denotes the standard share of physical capital, andE is the task compos-
ite. Furthermore, Y is considered as the numeraire, i.e. PY = 1, so that returns to labor are in real terms.
Assuming profit maximization, the optimal demand for task composite is given by
E = P
− 1α
E B, (2)
where B = ((1− α)B)1/α and PE denotes the price index of the task composite, which will be defined below.
3.2 Task allocation
The task composite input is, in turn, produced using a continuum of differentiated tasks, t(i), defined over a
unit interval, i ∈ [0, 1]. Tasks are combined according to the following CES function:6
E =
[∫ 1
0
t(i)
σ−1
σ di
]σ/(σ−1)
, (3)
where σ ≥ 0 denotes the elasticity of substitution or complementarity between the tasks. Over the unit
interval tasks are ordered such that higher indexed tasks have higher content of complexity and skill require-
ment. Also, as in models with heterogeneous task productivity (cf. Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg, 2008), workers differ in terms of their comparative advantage performing tasks. Our aim is
to analyze the labor market implication of offshoring for medium-skill workers and its general equilibrium
effects for other skill groups. Therefore, we define the task productivity schedules of each type of labor in
terms in terms of the medium-skill workers.7 In this section we first discuss the allocation of tasks between
4Notice that whenB = 1 and α = 0, equation (1) reduces to the one used by Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
5This may be a function of exogenous variables such as total factor productivity (TFP) and physical capital.
6Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) assume perfect complementarity, i.e. a Leontief production function, σ = 0. Acemoglu
and Autor (2011) consider a Cobb-Douglas production function, i.e. σ = 1. Ottaviano et al. (2013); Groizard et al. (2014) use a CES
production technology.
7Since skill-task allocation is in the spirit of Recardian comparative advantage, the terms "relative task productivity" and "compara-
tive advantage" are used interchangeably.
8domestic skill groups and next the optimal task allocation to offshore workers.
3.2.1 Domestic task allocation
Let ϕL(i) and ϕH(i) denote the relative task productivity of low-skill and high-skill workers compared to
medium-skill workers, respectively.8 Since tasks are ordered in terms of skill intensity over the unit interval,
it follows ϕ′L(i) < 0 < ϕ
′
H(i). To produce some unit of task i, a firm will either employ lM (i) effective unit of
medium-skill workers, or ϕL(i)lL(i) effective units of low-skill workers, or ϕH(i)lH(i) effective units of high-
skill workers. That is, t(i) = ϕL(i)lL(i), or t(i) = lM (i), or t(i) = ϕH(i)lH(i), where lj(i) denotes units of
labor per task i. If a firm allocates tasks to low-, medium-, and high-skill workers, then each skill group will
produce a subset of tasks, Ij where Ij ∈ (0, 1), for j = {L,M,H}.
Letwj denote the effective marginal cost of hiring workers of skill type j to produce any task i ∈ Ij . Then,
by the law of one price, the optimal labor demand condition implies that the marginal cost within each skill
group (i.e. across each subrange of tasks) is constant. Moreover, notice that the unit cost of producing a
unit of task i is wL/ϕL(i) using low-skill workers, wH/ϕH(i) for high-skill workers, and wM for medium-skill
workers. Hence, given the functional properties of the relative task productivity schedules, ϕL(i) and ϕH(i),
the optimal domestic skill-task allocation must satisfy conditions at which the unit cost using different skill
groups to produce task i is equalized. These optimality conditions are presented in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 (Domestic task allocation). Allocation of tasks between domestic skill groups is defined as follows:
i) A firm will employ low-skill workers to produce tasks up to threshold IL and high-skill workers from
threshold IH , where
wM =
wL
ϕL(IL)
, (4)
wM =
wH
ϕH(IH)
. (5)
ii) The elasticity of task productivity schedules between domestic skill groups across the tasks is given by
εL ≡ −∂ lnϕL(IL)∂IL > 0 and εH ≡
∂ lnϕH(IH)
∂IH
> 0.
iii) For wL/ϕL(I˜) = wH/ϕH(I˜) > wM > max{wL/ϕL(0), wH/ϕH(1)}, it follows that 0 < IL < I˜ < IH < 1.
Lemma 1 i) defines the domestic skill-task allocation, characterized by two endogenous thresholds, IL
and IH . These thresholds denote the extensive domestic task margins. Lemma 1 ii) defines the magnitude
of changes at these extensive task margins, indicating the relative comparative advantage of medium-skill
workers compared to low-skill and high-skill workers across tasks. We capture this by the terms, εL and εH ,
accounting for the magnitude of changes in the neighborhood of IL and IH , respectively.
Lemma 1 iii) then establishes the necessary and sufficient conditions permitting the employment of all
three skill groups in equilibrium. The lower boundary indicates that low-skill workers are the most cost
8Readers familiar with Acemoglu and Autor (2011) will notice that the schedule of comparative advantage may be defined asϕL(i) ≡
aL(i)
aM (i)
and ϕH(i) ≡ aH (i)aM (i) , where aj(i) denotes the task productivity schedule of skill type j = {L,M,H}.
9efficient ones at the least skill-intensive task i = 0 and high-skill workers are the most cost efficient ones at
the most skill-intensive task i = 1. In addition, the upper boundary ensures that medium-skill workers have
comparative advantage in the middle range of the task distribution. For example, ifwL/ϕL(I˜) = wH/ϕH(I˜) ≤
wM , then medium-skill workers have no comparative advantage in performing any task relative to low- and
high-skill workers, until wM falls far enough.9 The labor market would then employ only low- and high-skill
workers.
To sum up, Lemma 1 shows that the domestic labor force is allocated over the unit interval as follows:
low-skill workers are employed in the interval i ∈ [0, IL], medium-skill workers in i ∈ (IL, IH), and high-skill
workers in i ∈ [IH , 1]. Figure 2 gives a graphical illustration of equilibrium task allocations.
3.2.2 Offshoring task allocation
As depicted in Figure 1, occupations concentrated in the middle range of the skill distribution are most
likely offshorable. The intuition behind this is that these occupations exhibit a high content of routine,
non-interactive and non-complex tasks, making them easily codifiable and reducing their "face-to-face" or
"physical presence" requirement Blinder (2009b).
To account for this stylized fact, we assume that the comparative advantage of offshore workers compared
to medium-skill workers has a non-monotonic feature. More precisely, let ζ(i) denote the task productivity
schedule of offshore workers relative to medium-skill workers, where its functional form is described by the
following assumption.
Assumption 1. There exists a threshold Iˇ such that for all i ∈ [0, Iˇ), ζ(i) is (strict) monotonically decreasing,
and for all i ∈ (Iˇ , 1], ζ(i) is (strict) monotonically increasing.
Hence, by Assumption 1 the relative task productivity schedule of offshore workers has a U-shaped form,
capturing the notion of the inverted U-shaped offshorability index in Figure 1. Tasks both at the lower and
upper end of the unit interval require a strong geographic proximity, e.g. due to high intensity in manual and
complex activities, respectively.10 This is in stark contrast to the standard approach in the literature, where
offshorability of domestic intermediate inputs (tasks) has a monotonic property and occurs in a dichoto-
mous form. That is, over the unit interval the offshoring decision is usually characterized by reallocation
of tasks from homogeneous domestic labor, performing a set of tasks on the upper (right-bounded) part
of the interval, to offshore labor, performing a set of tasks on the lower (left-bounded) part of the interval
(Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008).11
If a firm decides to offshore, it must pay a hiring cost for a unit of offshore workers,wO, and an additional
9Notice that at strict equality the potential employer is indifferent between all three skill groups at task margin I˜.
10Intuitively, these tasks require face-to-face contact and physical presence (Blinder, 2009a).
11One exception is the study by Ottaviano et al. (2013), in which offshoring is a reallocation of tasks performed previously by immi-
grants and natives. However, they do not account for skill heterogeneity and thus disregard to address the non-monotonicity property
of offshoring and the consequences of the internal skill-task reallocation effect.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium task allocation
1
i
wM
wL
ϕL(i)
wH
ϕH(i)
IL IH
τwOζ(i)
IO
Iˇ
I˜
0
transportation cost, τ , for each task i, such that the unit cost of producing task i abroad is τwOζ(i). We
summarize the inverse offshoring costs by ω ≡ 1τwO , where higher values of ω indicate easier offshoring.
The unit cost of producing task i abroad then are ζ(i)/ω, which should be compared to the unit costs wM
of producing it domestically with medium-skill workers. The conditions under which a profit maximizing
firm decides to offshore tasks and the optimal amount of offshore workers to employ in the task composite
is summarized in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 (Offshoring task allocation). Let IO ∈ (IL, IH) denote the Lebesgue measure of offshored tasks, then
i) the equilibrium value of a subset of offshored tasks is
wM =
ϕO(IO)
ω
, (6)
where ϕO(IO) = exp[µIO] is a positive monotonic transformation of ζ(·), µ > 0 denotes the elasticity of task
productivity schedules between offshore and medium-skill workers across tasks, and ϕ′O(IO) > 0.
ii) For all ω in the interval ϕO(0)wM < ω <
ϕO(I
′)
wM
, ∀i{i ∈ I ′ ↔ i ∈ IM = IH − IL} and IL < I˘| ∂ ln ζ(·)
∂i =0
< IH , it
follows that IO > 0 and IO ∈ (IL, IH).
Several properties of these conditions are worth mentioning. First, in Lemma 2 i) equation (6) indicates
that at the extensive offshoring margin, IO, the marginal cost of offshoring must equal the marginal costs
of producing tasks using domestic medium-skill worker. Thus, a firm will assign tasks to offshore workers if
wM > ϕO(i)/ω, ∀i : i ∈ IO, i /∈ (IL, IH), IO ∈ (IL, IH). Part ii) denotes the necessary and sufficient conditions
that ensure the existence of offshoring and hence avoid corner solutions in equilibrium. Figure 2 depicts
11
the equilibrium allocation of tasks between medium-skill workers and offshore, and between domestic skill
groups.
3.3 Labor demand
Having decided to allocate tasks among the domestic skill groups and between offshore and medium-skill
workers, a profit-maximizing firm decides on the amount of workers to hire. Let Nj denote the total (ex-
ogenously given) mass of workers of skill type j = {L,M,H} and nO be the (endogenously given) mass of
offshore workers employed by a firm. Then Lemma 3 establishes the equilibrium values of inverse labor
demand and the task composite.
Lemma3 (Labor demand). Given the task margins IL, IH , and IO, and given the price index of task composite
PE , we obtain the inverse demand for
i) domestic workers
wL = PE
(
E
NL
) 1
σ
γL(IL)
1
σ , (7)
wM = PE
(
E
NM
) 1
σ
(IH − IL − IO) 1σ , (8)
wH = PE
(
E
NL
) 1
σ
γH(IH)
1
σ , (9)
ii) offshore workers
wO = PE
(
E
nO
) 1
σ
τ
1−σ
σ γO(IO)
1
σ , (10)
where γL(IL) =
∫ IL
0
ϕL(i)
σ−1di, γO(IO) =
∫
i∈IO ϕO(i)
1−σdi, and γH(IH) =
∫ 1
IH
ϕH(i)
σ−1di.
iii) The equilibrium value of task composite is given by
E =
[
γL(IL)
1
σN
σ−1
σ
L + (IH − IL − IO)
1
σN
σ−1
σ
M + γO(IO)
1
σ n
σ−1
σ
O + γH(IH)
1
σN
σ−1
σ
H
] σ
σ−1
. (11)
From Eqs. (7)–(10) it is evident that inverse labor demand is an increasing function of the respective task
margins, i.e. ∂wL∂IL > 0,
∂wH
∂IH
> 0, and ∂nO∂IO > 0.
To obtain the marginal cost of the task composite, note that the optimization problem of a firm is char-
acterized by means of the minimization of production costs of a task composite unit. From equilibrium
conditions (4) and (5) in Lemma 1, condition (6) in Lemma 2 together with the equilibrium results in Lemma
3, Lemma 4 shows the value of overall marginal cost of task production in equilibrium.
Lemma 4 (Marginal cost). The marginal cost of the task composite is given by CE = Ω(IL, IH , IO)wM , where
Ω(IL, IH , IO) =
[
γL(IL)ϕL(IL)
1−σ − IL + γO(IO)ϕO(IO)σ−1 − IO + γH(IH)ϕH(IH)1−σ + IH
] 1
1−σ . (12)
For 0 < {IL, IO, IH} < 1, ∂Ω∂IL < 0, ∂Ω∂IO < 0, ∂Ω∂IH > 0. Moreover, the perfect competition nature of the market
for task performance implies
PE = CE . (13)
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Equation (13) shows that, in any perfect competition equilibrium, the price index must equal the marginal
cost. Equation (12) denotes the equilibrium value of the marginal cost – capturing both the internal skill-
task allocation, i.e. among the domestic skill groups, and the external task relocation, i.e. between domestic
medium-skill and offshore workers. The implied endogenous adjustment to external shocks highlights the
novel feature of the task-assignment approach. For instance, from Lemma 2 we know that easier offshoring
(i.e. higher values of ω), e.g. due to lower hiring costs (dwO < 0) or lower trade costs (dτ < 0), lead to an in-
crease at the extensive offshoring task margin IO, implying relocation of additional tasks abroad. The partial
derivative of IO in equation (12) then shows that easier offshoring will decrease the overall marginal costs
of task production. The intuition behind this effect is that a decline in offshoring costs has also an impact
on the cost structure at the intensive task margin, referring to cost savings on all tasks that has been already
produced abroad. This effect is referred to as the productivity effect.
However, the Walrasian nature of the labor market requires the re-employment of offshoring-induced
displaced medium-skilled workers. This implies that the marginal cost of hiring medium-skill workers must
decline, increasing their competitiveness performing tasks in the neighborhood of task margins IL and IH .
As elaborated below, this endogenous internal task reallocation from low-skill and high-skill to medium-
skill workers will mitigate the productivity effect. This is a novel feature of our model which stands in stark
contrast to the standard approach in the literature. Our theoretical model highlights the importance of skill
heterogeneity because it allows to capture important indirect adjustment mechanisms, which are critical to
address the impact of offshoring on skill-wage inequality.
3.4 Equilibrium solution
The general equilibrium closed form solution to the equilibrium task margins (IL, IO, and IH) is character-
ized by the equilibrium demand condition for task composite, Eq. (2), the optimal task allocation conditions,
Eqs. (4) and (5) in Lemma 1, and Eq. (6) in Lemma 2, as well as the optimal labor demand conditions, (7)–
(10). From these conditions, we obtain a system of three equations determining simultaneously the implicit
solution to the task margins, shown by Lemma 5.
Lemma5 (Implicit solution to task margins). Given Lemmas 1–4, the implicit equilibrium solution to the task
margins is
NL
NM
=
γL(IL)
(IH − IL − IO)ϕL(IL)σ , (14a)( B
NM
)α
ω =
ϕO(IO)Ω(·)1−σα
(IH − IL − IO)α , (14b)
NM
NH
=
(IH − IL − IO)ϕH(IH)σ
γH(IH)
. (14c)
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Note that the left hand side of Eqs. (14a)–(14c) is denoted by exogenous parameters and variables of the
model, i.e. the skill endowment and offshoring costs, while the right hand side is a function of all three task
margins. We summarize the equilibrium characteristics in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Unique equilibrium). Given Lemma 1 and 2, the system of equations (14a)–(14c) determines
the unique equilibrium values for all endogenous task margins {IL, IH , IO} as a function of the exogenous
variables and parameters.
Having solved implicitly for the equilibrium values of task margins, the convenient block-recursive struc-
ture of the model allows to solve for other endogenous variables (wL,wM ,wH ,nO,PE ,E) by using the results
in Lemma 3 and 4.
4 Easier Offshoring: Task Reallocation, Productivity and Real Wages
In this section we analyze the implications of the model for the effect of a marginal decline in offshoring
costs on the task reallocation and real domestic wages. Note that easier offshoring is associated with dω > 0
induced either by i) dwO < 0, e.g. due to accumulation of human capital abroad, or by ii) dτ < 0, e.g. because
of abolition of transportation barriers.
To derive the effects of easier offshoring on domestic real wages, recall from Lemma 3 the optimal do-
mestic labor demand functions, (7), (8) and (9). Utilizing equation (2) and the results derived in Lemma 1
and 4, yields
wL =
(
Ω(·)
ϕL(IL)
)−(1−ασ)
γL(IL)
αKL,
wM = Ω(·)−(1−ασ)(IH − IL − IO)αKM ,
wH =
(
Ω(·)
ϕH(IH)
)−(1−ασ)
γH(IH)
αKH ,
where Kj ≡ ln (NjB)−α is a constant. Now taking logs in the previously derived equations, we can com-
pute the impact of a marginal decrease in offshoring costs on real wages, which is given by
d lnwL
dω
=
(
α
sL
− (1− ασ)εL
)
dIL
dω
− (1− ασ)d ln Ω
dω
(15)
d lnwM
dω
= − α
IH − IL − IO
[
dIO
dω
−
(
dIH
dω
− dIL
dω
)]
− (1− ασ)d ln Ω
dω
(16)
d lnwH
dω
= −
(
α
sH
− (1− ασ)εH
)
dIH
dω
− (1− ασ)d ln Ω
dω
, (17)
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where sj =
γj(Ij)
ϕj(Ij)1−σ
denotes the average range of tasks performed by skill type j ∈ {L,H}.
In order to assess the signs of equations 15–17, we need to know the signs of dILdω ,
dIO
dω , and
dIH
dω , which will
be discussed in the section 4.1 (i.e. Lemma 2), and the signs of dΩdω (i.e. Lemma 6, which will be discussed in
section 4.2. The overall effect on real wages is then discussed in section 4.3 (i.e. Proposition 3).
4.1 Easier offshoring and task reallocation
Utilizing the system (14a)–(14c) derived in Lemma 5, we first discuss how a decline in offshoring costs affects
the task allocation both among domestic skill groups as well as between domestic and offshore workers.
Taking logs in the equations derived in the system (14) and rearranging, we obtain
− ln
(
NL
NM
)
− ln (IH − IL − IO)− σ lnϕL(IL) + ln γL(IL) = 0 (18a)
−α ln
( B
NM
)
− α ln (IH − IL − IO) + lnϕO(IO) + (1− σα) ln Ω(·) = lnω (18b)
− ln
(
NM
NH
)
+ ln (IH − IL − IO) + σ lnϕH(IH)− ln γH(IH) = 0. (18c)
Now we can compute the impact of easier offshoring on the task margins. We summarize the main results
in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 (Easier offshoring of medium-skill tasks and changes in task margins). The extent and the
impact of easier offshoring (dω > 0) on task allocation is characterized by:
i) An expansion of the offshorable range of tasks and a contraction of low- and high-skill-intensive tasks
ranges
dIL
dω
< 0,
dIO
dω
> 0,
dIH
dω
> 0, and
∣∣∣∣dIOdω
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣dIHdω
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣dILdω
∣∣∣∣ .
ii) An asymmetric impact on the domestic skill-task reallocation
∣∣∣∣dILdω
∣∣∣∣ Q ∣∣∣∣dIHdω
∣∣∣∣ , ⇔ ( 1sL + σεL
)
Q
(
1
sH
+ σεH
)
.
The intuition can be explained in the following way. Easier offshoring, e.g. due to lower transporta-
tion cost (dτ < 0), or a decline in foreign wage costs (dwO < 0), increases the cost advantage for a firm to
reallocate domestic tasks abroad. This effect displaces medium-skill workers performing tasks in the neigh-
borhood of IO. The law-of-one price and the perfectly competitive labor market imply a downward wage
adjustment for medium-skill workers. The no-arbitrage conditions (4) and (5) in Lemma 1 then indicate a
reallocation of displaced medium-skill workers to low skill-intensive (i.e. lower IL) and high skill-intensive
(i.e. higher IH) tasks.
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Thus, Proposition 2 highlights what Costinot and Vogel (2010) call a task upgrading at the high-skill ex-
tensive margin, i.e. more medium-skill workers produce former high-skill tasks, and a task downgrading at
the low-skill extensive margin, i.e. more medium-skill workers produce former low-skill tasks.12 The key
determinants behind the magnitude of the skill down- and upgrading are εL and εH , indicating the elastic-
ity of task productivity schedules of medium-skill workers relative to low-skill and high-skill workers at the
equilibrium task margins IL and IH , respectively. A relatively high comparative advantage at the high skill-
intensive tasks (higher values of εH) implies that medium-skill workers are disproportionately allocated into
low-skill-intensive job tasks. The empirical literature has highlighted a gradual growth of low-paid service
jobs (cf. Autor and Dorn, 2013) and skill downgrading, in particular of medium-skill workers (cf. Brynin and
Longhi, 2009) in many advanced countries.
4.2 Easier offshoring and productivity
We now turn to the determinants of the offshoring-induced productivity effect. As highlighted earlier, this
effect reduces the overall marginal cost of task production, which in turn may lead to beneficial outcomes
for the domestic skill groups. However, the magnitude of this effect depends on the interaction between the
external task relocation and the internal task-skill reallocation. Therefore, the labor market implication of
offshoring differs crucially from Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), where by construction the internal
skill-task allocation is omitted. It also differs from the approach by Acemoglu and Autor (2011), where off-
shoring is exogenously introduced in terms of a fixed range and the cost index of task composite (PE) is held
constant.
From Proposition 2 we know the sign of changes in the task margins
(
dIH
dω ,
dIL
dω ,
dIO
dω
)
. The only term which
is not defined yet is the last term in Eqs. (15)–(17), d ln Ωdω , capturing the impact of offshoring costs on the
overall marginal cost of task composite. This last term is the source of the productivity effect. The following
lemma summarizes the conditions defining the sign of changes in the overall marginal costs.
Lemma 6 (Offshoring and overall marginal costs). Given the results in Proposition 2, changes in overall
marginal costs due to lower offshoring costs can be decomposed into an internal task-skill reallocation (D)
and an external task relocation (F), i.e.
d ln Ω(·)
dω
=
(
λHεH
dIH
dω
− λLεL dIL
dω
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
D>0
−
(
λOµ
dIO
dω
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
F>0
< 0 ⇔ µ > max
{
λL
λO
εL,
λH
λO
εH
}
, (19)
where λj denote the cost share of labor type j ∈ {L,H,O}.
12Notice, however, that (easier) offshoring in our framework differs from Costinot and Vogel (2010, section VI.B.). Their results affirm
a pervasive rise in wages of more skilled workers, i.e. an increase in inequality, induced by an implicit increase in the size of the relatively
skill scarce foreign economy. In contrast, we follow up on the recent empirical findings on the offshoring-induced changes in the skill-
wage structure (e.g. polarization effect) and highlight the key channels behind its impact on real wages and employment.
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Equation (19) highlights two novel features. First, a reduction in the overall marginal costs of task pro-
duction due to a reduction in offshoring costs (F) is mitigated by an endogenous internal adjustment of the
domestic labor market (D). Second, the magnitude of the offshoring-induced productivity effect depends
on the relative productivity of task production between medium-skill and offshore workers. Contrary to
the standard approach in the literature, offshoring is not simply limited to relocation of inputs abroad, but
more importantly it induces also an internal, domestic reallocation of inputs across the domestic workforce.
Therefore, offshoring-induced displaced medium-skill workers will compete on tasks which are produced
by low- and high-skill workers. This endogenous response generates an ambiguous relationship between
offshoring and the productivity effect. Intuitively, easier offshoring leads to a contraction of medium skill-
intensive tasks and to a specialization of the home country in performing low and high skill-intensive tasks
(dIL/dω < 0, dIH/dω > 0). This specialization pattern raises the return to low-skills and high-skills and thus
mitigates the direct cost-savings effect from offshoring.
Moreover, Equation (19) shows the key determinant dispelling this ambiguity. Whenever the comparative
advantage of medium-skill workers relative to offshore workers is sufficiently high in the neighborhood of
IO (indicating high values of µ) the external (foreign) task allocation will become a dominating factor. The
intuition is that a firm will save more on production costs at the intensive offshoring task margin due to a de-
cline in offshoring costs than it shifts domestic jobs abroad. Thus, accounting for internal task reallocations
between domestic skill groups is critical to capture potential adjustment mechanisms of the domestic labor
market in result of easier offshoring.
4.3 Easier offshoring and real wages
In equations (15)–(17) the overall sign of the productivity effect is defined by −(1 − ασ)d ln Ωdω . Whether a de-
cline in offshoring costs is translated into higher real wages for the domestic workforce, therefore depends
next to the sign of d ln Ωdω also on the magnitude of another key parameter. A greater elasticity of substitu-
tion between tasks (i.e. a higher value of σ) implies that tasks produced at home can be easily replaced by
cheaper offshore workers and relocated abroad. The empirical evidence suggests a substantial degree of
complementarity between tasks, cf. Autor et al. (2003); Peri and Sparber (2009). For example, using US data
Peri and Sparber (2009) show that estimated values for the elasticity of substitution between manual and
communication tasks range between 0.63 and 1.43. Overall, the productivity effect will lead to an increase in
real domestic wages if and only if σ < 1/α and µ is sufficiently large.
The impact of offshoring on real wages is also characterized by task demand effect for each skill group
due to changes at the extensive task margins. This is denoted by the first term on the right hand side of Eqs.
(15)–(17). Given the results in Proposition 2, medium-skill workers experience a decline in labor demand
per task. This is the job displacement effect due to increasing direct competition with offshore workers.
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The task demand effect for low-skill and high-skill workers is ambiguous and depends on their comparative
advantage at IL and IH , respectively. From equation (15) changes in task demand for low-skill workers is
given by
(
α
sL
− (1− ασ)εL
)
dIL
dω . Whether the labor demand per task for low-skill workers declines depends
on the value of εL, capturing the extent of changes in the neighborhood of IL. Similarly, in equation (17)
changes in labor demand per task for high-skill workers is given by −
(
α
sH
− (1− ασ)εH
)
dIH
dω and depends
on εH , capturing the extent of changes in the neighborhood of IH .
Hence, the extent of internal skill-task allocation is crucially determined by the elasticity of task produc-
tivity schedules between low-skill and high-skill workers relative to medium-skill workers in the neighbor-
hood of IL and IH , respectively. Moreover, for sufficient high values of εL and εH , there will be, respectively, a
favorable task demand shift for low-skill and high-skill workers at the intensive task margin, increasing their
real wages. The intuition behind this lies in the specialization effect induced by easier offshoring: the home
country becomes more specialized in the range of low and high skill-intensive tasks, i.e. dIL/dω < 0 and
dIH/dω > 0, respectively. This specialization pattern gives the rationale behind recent wage polarization
trends in many advanced countries.
In Proposition 3, we summarize the main conditions under which easier offshoring leads to a productivity
effect raising real wages of all skill groups.
Proposition 3 (Offshoring and real wages). Assuming a sufficient degree of complementarity across tasks,
σ < 1/α, a marginal decline in offshoring costs induces a positive real wage effect for all skill groups in the
home country if and only if
1. α(1−ασ)sL < εL <
α
1−ασ
1
λL(IH−IL−IO) ,
2. α(1−ασ)sH < εH <
α
1−ασ
1
λH(IH−IL−IO) ,
3. α1−ασ
1
λO(IH−IL−IO) < µ.
The boundaries of the elasticities can be straightforwardly derived as follows. From Eqs. (16) and (19) we
obtain the lower boundary in part 3 and the upper limits in parts 1 and 2. The lower limits in parts 1 and 2
are derived from (15) and (17), respectively.
These jointly sufficient conditions in Proposition 3 highlight the key parameters determining the direc-
tion and magnitude of various channels through which offshoring affects the domestic skill-wage structure.
On the one hand, wage gains for the domestic workforce resulting from offshoring-induced productivity ef-
fects depend on the elasticity of substitution between the tasks. On the other hand, the elasticity of task pro-
ductivity schedules between domestic skill groups across tasks as well as between medium-skill and offshore
workers play a critical role in determining the magnitude of internal skill-task allocation and the productiv-
ity effect. These are novel features of our model. It is worth noticing that easier offshoring unambiguously
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induces the specialization effect, i.e. dIL/dω < 0 and dIH/dω > 0. However, as we discuss below, with equi-
librium unemployment, characterized by an endogenous wage-setting curve, the specialization becomes
ambiguous.
5 Equilibrium unemployment
So far we have considered a Walrasian labor market. However, another important concern raised in the
public debate on offshoring is the displacement effect of least-skilled workers, leading to unemployment.
In the this section, we discuss the internal skill-task reallocation effects of offshoring when there are labor
market frictions. Particularly, we extend the framework by allowing for equilibrium unemployment. In doing
so, we assume that only low-skill workers face the risk of unemployment. Intuitively and in line with our
discussion in the introduction, easier offshoring may indirectly displace low-skill workers from the labor
market due to increasing competition with medium-skill workers who have been displaced by offshoring.
This potential displacement effect is referred to as the crowding-out effect (cf. Muysken et al., 2015).
We assume two potential sources of labor market frictions, without altering considerably the structure of
the model. One potential source of frictions might be a minimum wage regime, which is set above the market
equilibrium wage rate. Consequently, a proportion of low-skill workers ends up unemployed. Alternatively,
frictions can arise when we allow for endogenous supply of low-skill labor services. In this case, we assume
that the low-skill wage rate is set as a mark-up over the unemployment benefits, where the mark-up depends
negatively on unemployment rate. While the former is the mirror image of the full-employment case, char-
acterized by a perfect inelastic labor supply curve, the latter allows for an elastic labor supply curve and thus
accounts for a more general scenario of labor market frictions.
5.1 Minimumwage regime
Let the institutional minimum wage be W¯ . We assume that the minimum wage is set sufficiently low such
that it is still attractive for a firm to employ low-skill workers, but is sufficiently high such that a proportion of
low-skill workers ends up unemployed. Let uL denote the low-skill unemployment rate. Formally, we impose
the following assumption on the minimum wage scheme.
Assumption 2 (Minimum wage scheme).
wL/ϕL(0) < W¯/ϕL(0) < wM ,
where wL and wM are the equilibrium values resulting from the model analyzed in the previous section.
In addition, compared to the full-employment case, only a fraction of low-skill workers can be hired, i.e.
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nL = (1 − uL)NL, and the resource constraint is now given by
∫ IL
0
lL(i)di = nL.13 Hence, the labor market
adjustment for low-skill workers is now through employment. The next lemma summarizes the adjusted
equilibrium conditions.
Lemma 7 (Minimum wage and adjusted equilibrium conditions). If the low-skill labor market is charac-
terized by a minimum wage scheme, then by Assumption 2 a firm sets the optimal task margin for low-skill
workers such that the no-arbitrage condition holds, i.e.
wM =
W¯
ϕL(IL)
, (20)
and decides on the optimal amount of low-skill workers by means of cost minimization
W¯ = PE
(
E
nL
) 1
σ
γL(IL)
1
σ . (21)
The adjusted implicit equilibrium solution to task margin IL is given by
( B
NM
)α
W¯−1 =
Ω(·)1−ασ
ϕL(IL)(IH − IL − IO)α . (22)
It is readily seen that equation (22) is the counterpart of equation (14a) in the Walrasian labor market
discussed above. Thus, from equation (22) together with the implicit solutions (14b) and (14c) derived in
Lemma 5, we obtain a 3 × 3 system of equations characterizing the implicit solution to the task margins
under the minimum wage scheme.
To grasp an idea about consequences of a minimum wage scheme above the market clearing wage rate
for low-skill workers, we analyze the consequences of a marginal increase in the minimum wage scheme on
the task allocation. Intuitively, given the level of the minimum wage, the representative firm will reallocate
the tasks from low-skill to medium-skill workers up to the task margin such that equation (20) holds again,
implying a lower equilibrium value of task margin IL. Moreover, from the general equilibrium perspective, it
follows that task margins IO and IH will readjust also increase. This is because the minimum wage raises the
relative demand for medium-skill workers, and thus their wages too. By the law of one price, the comparative
advantage of medium-skill workers relative to high-skill and offshore workers in the neighborhood of IH and
IO, respectively, decreases. Consequently, the range of tasks performed by high-skill (1 − IH) and offshore
workers IO must increase in order to fulfill Eqs. (5) and (6).
Recalling the 3× 3 system of equations characterized by Eqs. (14b), (14c), and (22), taking logs and rear-
13For the sake of simplicity, we keep the same notation of equilibrium variables as in the frictionless labor market scenario and
highlight differences where necessary.
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ranging slightly, we obtain
−α ln
( B
NM
)
− α ln (IH − IL − IO)− lnϕL(IL) + (1− ασ) ln Ω(·) + ln W¯ = 0 (23a)
−α ln
( B
NM
)
− α ln (IH − IL − IO) + lnϕO(IO) + (1− ασ) ln Ω(·)− lnω = 0 (23b)
− ln
(
NM
NH
)
+ ln (IH − IL − IO) + σ lnϕH(IH)− ln γH(IH) = 0. (23c)
To compute the impact of the minimum wage on the task margins, we differentiate the system in (23) with
respect to W¯ . The following proposition summarizes the main results of the impact of a marginal increase
in minimum wage scheme as well as of a marginal decline of offshoring costs on task margins.
Proposition 4 (Minimum wage, offshoring, and task reallocation). Given a minimum wage scheme in the
low-skill labor market segment and offshoring of medium skill-intensive tasks, a rise in the minimum wage
scheme will lead to a contraction of low skill-intensive tasks, i.e. dIL
dW¯
< 0, and to an expansion of high skill-
intensive and offshorable tasks, i.e. dIH
dW¯
< 0 and dIO
dW¯
> 0, respectively. Moreover, easier offshoring generates
similar task reallocation effects as in Proposition 2.
In order to assess the impact of easier offshoring on the low-skill unemployment rate we utilize equa-
tion (2) and the equilibrium conditions derived in Lemma 1 and 4 in the adjusted low-skill labor demand
condition (21). Then, taking logs and rearranging slightly, we obtain
lnnL = ln γL(IL) +
(
1
α
− σ
)
lnϕL(IL)−
(
1
α
− σ
)
ln Ω(·)− 1
α
ln W¯ + σ lnB.
Now total differentiating with respect to offshoring friction (ω) yields
d lnnL
dω
=
1
α
(
α
sL
− (1− ασ)εL
)
dIL
dω
− 1
α
(1− ασ)d ln Ω
dω
. (24)
From Eq. (24) it is readily seen that under a minimum wage scheme the impact of offshoring on low-skill
(un)employment is characterized by similar channels as in the Walrasian case, derived in equation (15). We
summarize the main result in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Minimum wage, offshoring, and low-skill unemployment). If a fraction of low-skill workers is
unemployed due to a minimum wage scheme, then a marginal decline in offshoring costs will lead to a decline
in the low-skill unemployment rate if and only if Proposition 3 holds.
As the low-skill wage is fixed by the minimum wage scheme, employment has to adjust. Consequently,
the same determinants as in the Walrasian scenario will affect changes in low-skill employment.
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5.2 Endogenous low-skill labor supply
A more general approach addressing labor market frictions is to allow low-skill workers to supply endoge-
nously labor services, implying an elastic labor supply curve. We follow the standard approach in the liter-
ature and assume that the low-skill wage is a mark-up on unemployment benefits that depends negatively
on the unemployment rate. This mark-up can be explained in many ways, such as the standard individ-
ual leisure–work choice, wage bargaining (Layard et al., 2005), search and matching theory à la Pissarides
(2000) and efficiency wages à la Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). Imposing such a negative relationship between
the mark-up and unemployment induces an elastic labor supply curve. As discussed below, this approach
has important implications for labor market outcomes, providing new insights regarding the interaction be-
tween supply and demand sides of the labor market. This way, we provide a more general analysis of the
indirect consequences due to the internal skill-task reallocation of offshoring on low-skill labor market com-
pared to the minimum wage case.14
More precisely, we make the following assumption on the structure of the low-skill labor market segment
Assumption 3 (Endogenous low-skill wage curve). Let the endogenous low-skill wage curve be characterized
by
wL = f(uL)bL, (25)
where f(uL) denotes the mark-up over unemployment benefits, bL, and has the following properties: f(uL) > 1
and ∂f(uL)∂uL < 0. Moreover, we define the elasticity of the wage curve with respect to uL as δ ≡ −
∂ ln f(uL)
∂uL
> 0.
Hence, in contrast to the full employment and minimum wage cases, Assumption 3 indicates that both
the low-skill wage and employment will react to exogenous shocks. The next lemma summarizes the ad-
justed equilibrium conditions regarding the low-skill labor demand and task margin IL.
Lemma 8 (Endogenous labor supply and adjusted equilibrium conditions). If the low-skill labor market is
characterized by an endogenous wage curve described in Assumption 3, then adjusted general equilibrium
demand for low-skill workers is given by
wL =
(
γL(IL)
(1− uL)NL
)α
Ω(·)−(1−ασ)ϕL(IL)(1−ασ)Bα, (26)
where nL = (1 − uL)NL has been utilized. The adjusted optimality condition characterizing the implicit
14It is worth mentioning the important implications of applying different equilibrium unemployment paradigms regarding the adjust-
ment mechanism of the labor market to exogenous shocks. However, our objective is not to explain the efficiency of various adjustment
mechanisms, and thus we deliberately leave this to future research. For an application of search-matching and efficiency wage theories
to the original task-based approach of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), see Kohler and Wrona (2011).
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equilibrium solution to task margin IL is given by
NL
NM
=
1
1− uL
γL(IL)ϕL(IL)
−σ
IH − IL − IO . (27)
Finally, the market-clearing condition for low-skill workers requires
f(uL)bL =
(
γL(IL)
(1− uL)NL
)α
Ω(·)−(1−ασ)ϕL(IL)(1−ασ)Bα. (28)
From the adjusted equilibrium conditions (27) and (28) together with the implicit solutions (14b) and
(14c) in Lemma 5, we obtain a 4 × 4 implicit system of equations characterizing the general equilibrium
solution to the four endogenous variables IL, IH , IO and uL. Taking logs in these equations and rearranging,
we get
−α ln
( B
NL
)
+ ln bL + ln f(uL) + α ln(1− uL) + (1− ασ) (ln Ω(·)− lnϕL(IL))− α ln γL(IL) = 0. (29a)
− ln
(
NL
NM
)
− ln(1− uL)− ln(IH − IL − IO)− σ lnϕL(IL) + ln γL(IL) = 0 (29b)
−α ln
( B
NM
)
− α ln (IH − IL − IO) + lnϕO(IO) + (1− ασ) ln Ω(·)− lnω = 0 (29c)
− ln
(
NM
NH
)
+ ln (IH − IL − IO) + σ lnϕH(IH)− ln γH(IH) = 0 (29d)
Now the marginal impact of offshoring on task margins and the low-skill unemployment rate can be
computed by straightforward differentiation of the system in (29) with respect to ω. We summarize the main
results in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (Offshoring, endogenous labor supply, and low-skill unemployment). Let the low-skill labor
market be characterized by an endogenous wage curve, where a fraction uL of low-skill workers is unem-
ployed. Offshoring of medium-skill tasks leads unambiguously to an expansion of the range of offshored tasks
(dIO/dω > 0) and the extensive high-skill task margin (dIH/dω > 0). Moreover, easier offshoring reduces un-
ambiguously the low-skill unemployment rate and raises real wages of medium-skill and high-skill workers
if the sufficient conditions in Proposition 3 hold. The impact of a decline in offshoring costs on the exten-
sive low-skill task margin and low-skill wages is ambiguous. For a sufficiently inelastic low-skill wage curve
(i.e. high value of δ) easier offshoring leads unambiguously to a decline in the extensive low-skill task margin
(dIL/dω < 0) and an increase in low-skill wages.
Next to the importance of comparative advantage between skill groups in performing tasks, Proposition 6
highlights in addition the role of endogenous labor supply. This latter channel determines critically changes
in the extensive low-skill task margin, affecting importantly the specialization pattern in low skill-intensive
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tasks and the real wage of low-skill workers. Intuitively, the adjustment of the low-skill labor market segment
to the offshoring-induced internal skill-task reallocation is now characterized by higher unemployment and
lower wages due to a downward adjustment of the wage curve. However, the extent of this adverse adjust-
ment depends crucially on the elasticity of the low-skill wage curve. Whenever the sufficient conditions in
Proposition 3 hold, the productivity effect induces an increase in labor demand for low-sill workers along
the wage curve, leading to an unambiguous decline in low-skill unemployment. If the wage curve is suffi-
ciently inelastic (indicating a steeper slope), then this favorable shift in labor for low-skill workers will also
raise their real wages. The intuition behind the real wage effects for medium-skill and high-skill workers is
equivalent to the one discussed in Proposition 3.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the general equilibrium implications of offshoring for the domestic skill-
wage structure and for the low-skill unemployment rate. We develop a task-based model that accounts for
skill heterogeneity, endogenous task allocation between domestic skill groups as well as between domestic
and offshore workers, and equilibrium unemployment. We contribute to the existing literature by identifying
three important channels through which the domestic labor market responds to offshoring shocks. We show
that a marginal decline in offshoring costs of domestic medium skill-intensive tasks influences the domestic
labor market through: i) a productivity effect, due to cost-saving effects at extensive and intensive margins,
ii) an internal skill-task reallocation of tasks between domestic skill groups, and iii) a relative specialization
of the domestic economy in low and high skill-intensive tasks.
The magnitude and the direction of the productivity effect depend crucially on two key parameters. The
elasticity of task productivity schedules between medium-skill and offshore workers across tasks at the ex-
tensive task margin and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and offshore tasks. The results high-
light that for a sufficient high degree of task-specific comparative advantage of medium-skill workers relative
to offshore workers the magnitude of the productivity effect increases due to overall cost reductions of task
production, both at extensive and intensive margins. This follows from the low degree of substitution of
medium-skill workers by offshore workers in the neighborhood of extensive offshoring margins. However,
the direction of the productivity effect depends on the elasticity of substitution between tasks, performed
by domestic skill groups and offshore workers. Whenever there is a sufficient degree of complementarity
between these tasks, easier offshoring induces a positive labor market effect.
The magnitude of internal skill-task allocation is determined by two key factors. On the one hand, it
depends on the elasticity of task productivity schedules between low-skill and medium-skill workers in the
neighborhood of the extensive low-skill task margin. On the other hand, it depends on the elasticity of task
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productivity schedules between high-skill and medium-skill workers in the neighborhood of the extensive
high-skill task margin. The comparative static analysis indicate that for a sufficiently high elasticity of task
productivity schedules of low-skill and high-skill workers compared to medium-skill workers and comple-
mentarity between tasks, a marginal decline in offshoring costs will raise the wage rates of all domestic skill
groups. In addition, our results also indicate that easier offshoring leads to a stronger increase in real wages
of low-skill and high-skill workers relative to medium-skill workers, due to the specialization of the home
economy in the production of low and high skill-intensive tasks. This provides the rationale behind the re-
cent empirical evidence on wage polarization, observed in many advanced countries.
Finally, we extend the model with respect to equilibrium unemployment. We analyze the impact of off-
shoring under two alternative labor market frictions. First, we introduce a minimum wage scheme, which
forces a fraction low-skill workers in unemployment. Second, we account for a more general scenario of
labor market frictions in which low-skill labor market is characterized by an elastic wage curve. While in
both cases the main results of our model still hold, in the latter changes at the extensive low-skill task margin
become ambiguous. Whenever the wage curve is sufficiently inelastic, easier offshoring leads to a special-
ization in low skill-intensive tasks next to high skill-intensive tasks.
To sum up, our contribution is to disentangle important adjustment mechanisms and the underlying
determinants of labor market effects of offshoring. These new insights provide also useful rationalization for
the empirical literature.
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Appendix
A Data
In order to understand how offshoring affects the workforce in advanced countries, Blinder (2009a) provides a new index of offshora-
bility of 291 US occupations, which gives an idea about the potential impact of offshoring on the structure of occupation and thus the
consequences for workers in the US. However, our concern is regarding the effects of offshoring for domestic skill groups. We aug-
ment Blinder’s offshorability index in the following way, while for details regarding the estimation of the offshorability index we refer
the reader to Blinder (2009a). First, we extend the Appendix Table in Blinder (2009a) by collecting data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics on the skill distribution in each occupation. More specifically, we use data from the Employment Projections Program, which
contains information on education and training measurements for workers 25 years and older by detailed occupations in 2008. We
summarize the educational attainments into three broad skill groups. Low-skill denotes educational attainment “Less than high school
diploma”; Medium-skill is the sum of the following educational attainments: “high school diploma or equivalent”, “some college, no
degree”, and “Assiciate’s degree”; High-skill is defined by the following educational attainments: “Bachelor’s degrees”, “Master’s de-
grees”, and “Doctoral or professional degree”. We then adjust the offshorability index by the employment share of each occupation to
account for the potential magnitude of the job-destruction impact of offshoring for the domestic workforce. These results are presented
in Table A.1 below. In the second step, we order the 290 occupations by the high skill-intensity and estimate the fractional-polynomial
prediction of the adjusted offshorability index. Figure 1 in the main text depicts the predicted fit of the adjusted offshorabiltiy index.
Table A.1: Characteristics of 290 occupations by offshorability and skill intensity, for the U.S. in 2008
Occupation SOC code Offshorability
index
Adjusted
offshorability
index
Employment
Educational
attainment percent
distribution
Absolute Percent Low Medium High
General and operations managers 111021 55 258 1663810 4.7 2.2 49.2 48.6
Advertising and promotions managers 112011 53 6 41710 0.1 1.0 26.1 72.9
Marketing managers 112021 53 25 166470 0.5 1.0 33.3 65.7
Sales managers 112022 26 23 317970 0.9 1.0 33.3 65.7
Administrative services managers 113011 49 33 239410 0.7 2.2 60.0 37.8
Computer and information systems
managers
113021 55 40 259330 0.7 0.6 29.4 70.0
Financial managers 113031 75 75 353963 1.0 1.0 39.8 59.2
Training and development managers 113042 49 4 28720 0.1 2.3 41.6 56.1
Human resources managers, all other 113049 49 8 57830 0.2 2.3 41.6 56.1
Industrial production managers 113051 55 24 153950 0.4 3.7 54.1 42.1
Purchasing managers 113061 49 10 69300 0.2 1.1 42.7 56.3
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Table A.1: (continued)
Occupation SOC Code Offshorability
index
Adjusted
Offshorability
index
Employment
Educational
attainment percent
distribution
Absolute Percent Low Medium High
Transportation, storage, and distribution
managers
113071 49 12 84870 0.2 5.8 68.4 25.8
Engineering managers 119041 54 29 187410 0.5 0.8 17.2 82.0
Natural sciences managers 119121 56 6 40400 0.1 0.6 6.7 92.7
Wholesale and retail buyers, except farm
products
131022 55 21 132900 0.4 4.2 62.0 33.8
Purchasing agents, except wholesale, retail,
and farm products
131023 55 42 267410 0.8 2.0 59.5 38.6
Cost estimators 131051 50 29 204330 0.6 3.6 66.4 30.0
Compensation, benefits, and job analysis
specialists
131072 46 13 97740 0.3 1.6 45.8 52.6
Logisticians 131081 55 8 52220 0.1 2.0 54.7 43.3
Business operations specialists, all other 131199 25 65 916290 2.6 1.9 50.2 47.9
Accountants and auditors 132011 72 160 788415 2.2 0.3 24.7 75.0
Budget analysts 132031 60 9 53510 0.2 0.7 31.0 68.3
Credit analysts 132041 64 11 61500 0.2 1.4 42.4 56.2
Financial analysts 132051 76 39 180910 0.5 0.9 17.3 81.8
Insurance underwriters 132053 85 24 98970 0.3 0.6 49.4 50.0
Tax preparers 132082 68 11 58850 0.2 2.1 49.0 48.9
Financial specialists, all other 132099 50 17 122320 0.3 2.2 46.9 50.9
Computer and information scientists,
research
151011 96 7 25890 0.1 0.6 33.9 65.5
Computer programmers 151021 100 110 389090 1.1 0.6 29.4 70.0
Computer software engineers, applications 151031 74 95 455980 1.3 0.3 17.9 81.8
Computer software engineers, systems
software
151032 74 67 320720 0.9 0.3 17.9 81.8
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Table A.1: (continued)
Occupation SOC Code Offshorability
index
Adjusted
Offshorability
index
Employment
Educational
attainment percent
distribution
Absolute Percent Low Medium High
Computer support specialists * 151041 80 113 499860 1.4 1.0 57.9 41.1
Computer systems analysts 151051 93 129 492120 1.4 0.6 33.9 65.5
Database administrators 151061 75 21 99380 0.3 0.4 30.5 69.1
Network and computer systems
administrators
151071 50 38 270330 0.8 0.7 49.1 50.2
Network systems and data
communications analysts
151081 92 48 185190 0.5 0.7 43.2 56.1
Computer specialists, all other 151099 90 30 116760 0.3 0.6 33.9 65.5
Actuaries 152011 96 4 15770 0.0 0.1 2.8 97.0
Mathematicians 152021 96 1 2930 0.0 0.4 9.5 90.1
Operations research analysts 152031 82 12 52530 0.1 0.6 32.8 66.6
Statisticians 152041 96 5 17480 0.0 0.4 9.5 90.1
Mathematical technicians 152091 78 0 1430 0.0 0.4 9.5 90.1
Mathematical science occupations, all
other
152099 95 2 7320 0.0 0.4 9.5 90.1
Architects, except landscape and naval 171011 25 7 96740 0.3 0.3 11.5 88.1
Cartographers and photogrammetrists 171021 86 3 11260 0.0 0.5 24.5 75.0
Aerospace engineers 172011 37 8 81100 0.2 0.1 16.7 83.2
Biomedical engineers 172031 71 2 11660 0.0 0.0 25.5 74.5
Chemical engineers 172041 72 6 27550 0.1 0.2 9.1 90.7
Computer hardware engineers 172061 73 16 78580 0.2 0.3 28.2 71.5
Electrical engineers 172071 64 26 144920 0.4 0.2 22.2 77.6
Electronics engineers, except computer 172072 70 26 130050 0.4 0.2 22.2 77.6
Health and safety engineers. except
mining safety engineers and inspectors
172111 25 2 25330 0.1 0.3 31.8 67.9
32
Table A.1: (continued)
Occupation SOC Code Offshorability
index
Adjusted
Offshorability
index
Employment
Educational
attainment percent
distribution
Absolute Percent Low Medium High
Industrial engineers 172112 70 38 191640 0.5 0.3 31.8 67.9
Marine engineers and naval architects 172121 69 1 6550 0.0 0.8 28.3 70.9
Materials engineers 172131 71 4 20950 0.1 0.4 29.9 69.7
Mechanical engineers 172141 70 44 220750 0.6 0.3 26.6 73.0
Engineers, all other 172199 72 31 152940 0.4 0.3 19.4 80.4
Architectural and civil drafters 173011 90 26 101040 0.3 1.5 73.8 24.7
Electrical and electronics drafters 173012 98 8 30270 0.1 1.5 73.8 24.7
Mechanical drafters 173013 98 21 74650 0.2 1.5 73.8 24.7
Drafters. all other 173019 90 5 20870 0.1 1.5 73.8 24.7
Electrical and electronic engineering
technicians
173023 47 22 165850 0.5 3.7 79.3 17.0
Electro-mechanical technicians 173024 47 2 15130 0.0 3.7 79.3 17.0
Industrial engineering technicians 173026 72 15 73310 0.2 3.7 79.3 17.0
Mechanical engineering technicians 173027 72 9 46580 0.1 3.7 79.3 17.0
Engineering technicians, except drafters,
all other
173029 47 10 78300 0.2 3.7 79.3 17.0
Animal scientists 191011 85 1 3000 0.0 0.5 20.5 79.0
Food scientists and technologists 191012 79 2 7570 0.0 0.5 20.5 79.0
Biochemists and biophysicists 191021 83 4 17690 0.0 0.1 6.7 93.1
Microbiologists 191022 83 4 15250 0.0 0.1 6.7 93.1
Biological scientists, all other 191029 83 6 26200 0.1 0.1 6.7 93.1
Medical scientists, except epidemiologists 191042 55 11 73670 0.2 0.2 2.1 97.8
Life scientists, all other 191099 55 2 12790 0.0 0.2 2.1 97.8
Astronomers 192011 30 0 970 0.0 0.0 5.9 94.1
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Table A.1: (continued)
Occupation SOC Code Offshorability
index
Adjusted
Offshorability
index
Employment
Educational
attainment percent
distribution
Absolute Percent Low Medium High
Physicists 192012 67 3 15160 0.0 0.0 5.9 94.1
Atmospheric and space scientists 192021 81 2 7050 0.0 0.0 12.2 87.8
Chemists 192031 66 14 76540 0.2 0.2 7.8 92.0
Materials scientists 192032 66 1 7880 0.0 0.2 7.8 92.0
Physical scientists, all other 192099 66 4 23800 0.1 0.2 2.1 97.7
Economists 193011 89 3 12470 0.0 0.0 1.5 98.5
Survey researchers 193022 90 6 21650 0.1 0.4 21.7 77.9
Agricultural and food science technicians 194011 55 3 19340 0.1 5.5 67.7 26.7
Biological technicians 194021 55 10 67080 0.2 2.9 47.0 50.1
Chemical technicians 194031 55 9 59790 0.2 3.8 64.6 31.6
Geological and petroleum technicians 194041 35 1 11130 0.0 8.4 60.0 31.5
Nuclear technicians 194051 34 1 6050 0.0 2.6 54.1 43.3
Environmental science and protection
technicians, including health
194091 33 3 32460 0.1 2.6 54.1 43.3
Life, physical, and social science
technicians, all other
194099 39 7 63810 0.2 2.6 54.1 43.3
Lawyers 231011 51 15 105838 0.3 0.1 1.6 98.3
Paralegals and legal assistants 232011 51 31 217700 0.6 0.8 58.9 40.3
Legal support workers. all other 232099 52 4 28424 0.1 2.1 60.1 37.8
Library technicians 254031 33 11 115770 0.3 4.3 61.6 34.0
Art directors 271011 64 5 29350 0.1 3.1 40.7 56.2
Fine artists, including painters, sculptors,
and illustrators
271013 89 3 10390 0.0 3.1 40.7 56.2
Multimedia artists and animators 271014 87 6 23790 0.1 3.1 40.7 56.2
Artists and related workers, all other 271019 67 1 5290 0.0 3.1 40.7 56.2
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Table A.1: (continued)
Occupation SOC Code Offshorability
index
Adjusted
Offshorability
index
Employment
Educational
attainment percent
distribution
Absolute Percent Low Medium High
Commercial and industrial designers 271021 85 8 31650 0.1 2.7 46.5 50.8
Fashion designers 271022 73 3 12980 0.0 2.7 46.5 50.8
Graphic designers 271024 86 43 178530 0.5 2.7 46.5 50.8
Designers. all other 271029 77 3 12410 0.0 2.7 46.5 50.8
Actors 272011 48 8 59590 0.2 3.3 39.3 57.4
Producers and directors 272012 49 8 59070 0.2 0.8 28.9 70.2
Music directors and composers 272041 25 1 8610 0.0 4.8 41.6 53.6
Radio and television announcers 273011 30 3 41090 0.1 3.8 61.4 34.8
Broadcast news analysts 273021 40 1 6680 0.0 0.2 16.6 83.2
Editors 273041 93 25 96270 0.3 0.7 18.8 80.5
Technical writers 273042 93 12 46250 0.1 0.8 25.1 74.1
Writers and authors 273043 90 11 43020 0.1 0.6 16.3 83.1
Interpreters and translators 273091 93 6 21930 0.1 2.9 48.7 48.5
Media and communication workers, all
other
273099 55 4 25660 0.1 2.9 48.7 48.5
Audio and video equipment technicians 274011 36 4 40390 0.1 2.3 63.9 33.8
Broadcast technicians 274012 36 3 30730 0.1 2.3 63.9 33.8
Radio operators 274013 36 0 1190 0.0 2.3 63.9 33.8
Sound engineering technicians 274014 36 1 12680 0.0 2.3 63.9 33.8
Photographers 274021 25 4 58260 0.2 2.7 50.3 47.0
Camera operators, television, video, and
motion picture
274031 51 3 22530 0.1 2.9 41.4 55.6
Film and video editors 274032 95 4 15200 0.0 2.9 41.4 55.6
Media and communication equipment
workers, all other
274099 36 2 17200 0.0 2.3 63.9 33.8
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Table A.1: (continued)
Occupation SOC Code Offshorability
index
Adjusted
Offshorability
index
Employment
Educational
attainment percent
distribution
Absolute Percent Low Medium High
Medical and clinical laboratory
technologists
292011 58 25 155250 0.4 1.4 46.3 52.4
Medical and clinical laboratory technicians 292012 59 24 142330 0.4 1.4 46.3 52.4
Pharmacy technicians 292052 32 24 266790 0.8 2.5 80.9 16.7
Medical records and health information
technicians
292071 83 38 160450 0.5 3.7 81.8 14.5
Medical transcriptionists 319094 95 24 90380 0.3 4.8 83.2 12.0
Travel guides 396022 86 1 3120 0.0 5.4 54.8 39.8
Advertising sales agents 413011 25 11 153890 0.4 2.1 44.7 53.2
Securities, commodities, and financial
services sales agents
413031 51 36 251710 0.7 1.1 33.8 65.1
Travel agents 413041 50 13 88590 0.3 1.4 65.2 33.5
Telemarketers 419041 95 108 400860 1.1 9.0 75.2 15.8
Switchboard operators, including
answering service
432011 50 28 194980 0.6 5.4 85.9 8.7
Telephone operators 432021 95 8 29290 0.1 6.0 82.3 11.7
Communications equipment operators, all
other
432099 41 0 3870 0.0 4.0 69.8 26.2
Bill and account collectors 433011 65 79 431280 1.2 4.4 79.6 16.0
Billing and posting clerks and machine
operators
433021 90 130 513020 1.4 3.7 81.2 15.1
Bookkeeping, accounting, and auditing
clerks
433031 84 431 1815340 5.1 3.3 81.6 15.1
Payroll and timekeeping clerks 433051 67 39 205600 0.6 2.3 82.3 15.4
Procurement clerks 433061 67 14 71390 0.2 2.6 74.3 23.1
Brokerage clerks 434011 67 13 70110 0.2 3.1 70.2 26.7
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Table A.1: (continued)
Occupation SOC Code Offshorability
index
Adjusted
Offshorability
index
Employment
Educational
attainment percent
distribution
Absolute Percent Low Medium High
Correspondence clerks 434021 77 4 17990 0.1 9.6 74.6 15.8
Credit authorisers, checkers, and clerks 434041 80 15 65410 0.2 1.7 76.2 22.1
Customer service representatives A 434051 94 137 516925 1.5 4.5 73.9 21.6
Customer service representatives B 434051 70 102 516925 1.5 4.5 73.9 21.6
Customer service representatives C 434051 38 55 516925 1.5 4.5 73.9 21.6
File clerks 434071 50 32 229830 0.6 5.1 76.8 18.1
Interviewers A, except eligibility and loan 434111 48 14 100895 0.3 3.6 74.3 22.1
Loan interviewers and clerks A 434131 46 15 115850 0.3 2.0 76.4 21.7
Order clerks 434151 67 49 259760 0.7 9.6 74.6 15.8
Human resources assistants, except payroll
and timekeeping
434161 50 23 161870 0.5 2.5 72.9 24.6
Receptionists and information clerks 434171 75 77 362800 1.0 4.7 82.4 12.9
Reservation and transportation ticket
agents and travel clerks
434181 94 43 160120 0.5 3.8 68.4 27.8
Information and record clerks, all other 434199 92 75 288730 0.8 2.4 78.9 18.7
Dispatchers, except police, fire, and
ambulance
435032 72 35 172550 0.5 6.0 82.6 11.3
Postal service mail sorters, processors, and
processing machine operators
435053 25 15 208600 0.6 3.2 78.4 18.4
Production, planning, and expediting
clerks
435061 54 44 287980 0.8 3.2 69.4 27.3
Shipping, receiving, and traffic clerks 435071 29 62 759910 2.1 15.2 77.5 7.3
Stock clerks and order fillers 435081 34 156 1625430 4.6 15.8 76.1 8.2
Weighers, measurers, checkers, and
samplers, recordkeeping
435111 27 6 79050 0.2 14.5 72.6 12.9
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Table A.1: (continued)
Occupation SOC Code Offshorability
index
Adjusted
Offshorability
index
Employment
Educational
attainment percent
distribution
Absolute Percent Low Medium High
Secretaries, except legal, medical, and
executive A
436014 69 85 436095 1.2 2.6 80.8 16.6
Secretaries, except legal, medical, and
executive B
436014 38 47 436095 1.2 2.6 80.8 16.6
Computer operators 439011 75 27 129160 0.4 2.0 72.7 25.3
Data entry keyers 439021 100 84 296700 0.8 3.2 79.9 16.9
Word processors and typists 439022 94 41 153580 0.4 2.6 81.0 16.4
Desktop publishers 439031 93 8 29910 0.1 2.8 67.4 29.8
Insurance claims and policy processing
clerks
439041 93 63 239120 0.7 1.8 77.6 20.6
Mail clerks and mail machine operators,
except postal service
439051 26 11 148330 0.4 10.5 79.9 9.6
Office clerks, general A 439061 94 199 749343 2.1 4.3 78.2 17.5
Office clerks, general B 439061 70 148 749343 2.1 4.3 78.2 17.5
Office clerks, general C 439061 38 80 749343 2.1 4.3 78.2 17.5
Office machine operators, except computer 439071 51 13 87900 0.2 8.5 78.8 12.6
Proofreaders and copy markers 439081 95 5 18070 0.1 3.0 47.1 49.9
Statistical assistants 439111 90 5 18700 0.1 1.4 69.4 29.2
Office and administrative support workers,
all other A
439199 94 19 71818 0.2 2.8 67.4 29.8
Office and administrative support workers,
all other B
439199 70 14 71818 0.2 2.8 67.4 29.8
Office and administrative support workers,
all other C
439199 38 8 71818 0.2 2.8 67.4 29.8
Derrick operators, oil and gas 475011 36 1 13270 0.0 26.8 68.5 4.7
Rotary drill operators, oil and gas 475012 36 2 15500 0.0 26.8 68.5 4.7
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Table A.1: (continued)
Occupation SOC Code Offshorability
index
Adjusted
Offshorability
index
Employment
Educational
attainment percent
distribution
Absolute Percent Low Medium High
Service unit operators, oil, gas, and mining 475013 36 2 19530 0.1 26.8 68.5 4.7
Earth drillers, except oil and gas 475021 35 2 18800 0.1 19.5 76.3 4.2
Explosives workers, ordnance handling
experts and blasters
475031 35 0 4800 0.0 10.4 80.8 8.7
Continuous mining machine operators 475041 36 1 9000 0.0 17.1 79.7 3.1
Mine cutting and channelling machine
operators
475042 36 1 6080 0.0 17.1 79.7 3.1
Mining machine operators, all other 475049 36 0 2450 0.0 17.1 79.7 3.1
Rock splitters, quarry 475051 36 0 3600 0.0 24.9 71.7 3.4
Roof bolters, mining 475061 36 0 4140 0.0 24.9 71.7 3.4
Roustabouts, oil and gas 475071 36 3 33570 0.1 26.8 68.5 4.7
Helpers - extraction workers 475081 36 3 25550 0.1 24.9 71.7 3.4
Extraction workers. all other 475099 36 1 9060 0.0 24.9 71.7 3.4
Camera and photographic equipment
repairers
499061 26 0 3160 0.0 4.6 76.7 18.6
Watch repairers 499064 26 0 3080 0.0 4.6 76.7 18.6
First-line supervisors/managers of
production and operating workers
511011 68 131 679930 1.9 11.1 73.9 15.0
Aircraft structure, surfaces, rigging, and
systems assemblers
512011 55 4 22820 0.1 22.0 70.9 7.1
Coil winders, tapers, and finishers 512021 68 4 23190 0.1 22.5 71.7 5.8
Electrical and electronic equipment
assemblers
512022 66 39 207270 0.6 22.5 71.7 5.8
Electromechanical equipment assemblers 512023 66 11 57200 0.2 22.5 71.7 5.8
Engine and other machine assemblers 512031 66 9 49430 0.1 12.7 84.6 2.7
Structural metal fabricators and fitters 512041 68 18 93490 0.3 13.4 79.8 6.8
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Table A.1: (continued)
Occupation SOC Code Offshorability
index
Adjusted
Offshorability
index
Employment
Educational
attainment percent
distribution
Absolute Percent Low Medium High
Fibreglass laminators and fabricators 512091 68 6 30560 0.1 21.6 73.2 5.1
Team assemblers 512092 65 228 1242370 3.5 21.6 73.2 5.1
Timing device assemblers, adjusters, and
calibrators
512093 62 0 2460 0.0 21.6 73.2 5.1
Assemblers and fabricators, all other 512099 64 47 258240 0.7 21.6 73.2 5.1
Food batchmakers 513092 31 8 89400 0.3 25.6 68.9 5.5
Food cooking machine operators and
tenders
513093 27 3 43100 0.1 27.1 67.7 5.2
Computer-controlled machine tool
operators, metal and plastic
514011 68 26 136490 0.4 8.4 85.2 6.4
Numerical tool and process control
programmers
514012 95 5 17860 0.1 8.4 85.2 6.4
Extruding and drawing machine
setters, operators, and tenders, metal
and plastic
514021 68 17 87290 0.2 17.2 79.5 3.3
Forging machine setters, operators, and
tenders, metal and plastic
514022 68 7 33850 0.1 20.5 78.1 1.4
Rolling machine setters, operators, and
tenders, metal and plastic
514023 68 7 37500 0.1 19.1 77.4 3.5
Cutting, punching, and press machine
setters, operators, and tenders, metal
and plastic
514031 68 51 265480 0.7 22.0 74.9 3.1
Drilling and boring machine tool
setters, operators, and tenders, metal
and plastic
514032 68 8 43180 0.1 24.0 73.2 2.8
Grinding, lapping, polishing, and
buffing machine tool setters, operators,
and tenders, metal and plastic
514033 68 20 101530 0.3 28.4 69.0 2.6
Lathe and turning machine tool setters,
operators, and tenders, metal and
plastic
514034 68 14 71410 0.2 21.4 75.9 2.7
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Table A.1: (continued)
Occupation SOC Code Offshorability
index
Adjusted
Offshorability
index
Employment
Educational
attainment percent
distribution
Absolute Percent Low Medium High
Milling and planing machine setters,
operators, and tenders, metal and
plastic
514035 68 6 29140 0.1 23.3 72.5 4.2
Machinists 514041 61 63 368380 1.0 11.1 85.1 3.7
Metal-refining furnace operators and
tenders
514051 68 3 17960 0.1 14.4 82.3 3.3
Pourers and casters, metal 514052 68 3 14340 0.0 14.4 82.3 3.3
Model makers, metal and plastic 514061 65 1 8120 0.0 14.0 74.8 11.2
Patternmakers, metal and plastic 514062 65 1 6850 0.0 14.0 74.8 11.2
Foundry mould and coremakers 514071 65 3 15890 0.0 22.0 75.1 2.9
Moulding, coremaking, and casting
machine setters, operators, and tenders,
metal and plastic
514072 68 30 157080 0.4 22.0 75.1 2.9
Multiple machine tool setters, operators,
and tenders, metal and plastic
514081 68 19 98120 0.3 23.3 72.5 4.2
Tool and die makers 514111 70 20 99680 0.3 7.2 88.4 4.3
Welders, cutters, solderers, and brazers 514121 70 71 358050 1.0 23.9 73.9 2.3
Welding, soldering, and brazing machine
setters, operators, and tenders
514122 68 9 45220 0.1 23.9 73.9 2.3
Heat treating equipment setters, operators,
and tenders, metal and plastic
514191 70 5 26310 0.1 13.5 83.0 3.5
Lay-out workers, metal and plastic 514192 70 2 10970 0.0 23.3 72.5 4.2
Plating and coating machine setters,
operators, and tenders, metal and plastic
514193 70 8 40550 0.1 26.5 71.1 2.5
Tool grinders, filers, and sharpeners 514194 68 3 18180 0.1 16.6 77.9 5.5
Metal workers and plastic workers, all other 514199 70 10 49650 0.1 23.3 72.5 4.2
Bindery workers 515011 59 11 64330 0.2 18.5 74.3 7.2
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Table A.1: (continued)
Occupation SOC Code Offshorability
index
Adjusted
Offshorability
index
Employment
Educational
attainment percent
distribution
Absolute Percent Low Medium High
Bookbinders 515012 59 1 7660 0.0 18.5 74.3 7.2
Job printers 515021 58 8 50580 0.1 12.6 78.6 8.7
Prepress technicians and workers 515022 59 12 72050 0.2 6.4 75.4 18.1
Printing machine operators 515023 57 31 192520 0.5 13.0 80.4 6.5
Pressers, textile, garment, and related
materials
516021 75 17 78620 0.2 44.8 52.1 3.1
Sewing machine operators 516031 75 49 233130 0.7 43.2 51.5 5.2
Shoe and leather workers and repairers 516041 75 2 7680 0.0 29.6 61.1 9.3
Shoe machine operators and tenders 516042 75 1 3850 0.0 37.9 57.5 4.7
Sewers, hand 516051 75 2 11090 0.0 26.3 59.5 14.2
Textile bleaching and dyeing machine
operators and tenders
516061 75 5 21660 0.1 38.4 58.0 3.6
Textile cutting machine setters, operators
and tenders
516062 75 5 21420 0.1 38.4 58.0 3.6
Textile knitting and weaving machine
setters, operators and tenders
516063 75 9 42760 0.1 32.0 64.2 3.8
Textile winding, twisting, and drawing out
machine setters, operators and tenders
516064 75 10 47670 0.1 35.9 62.8 1.3
Extruding and forming machine setters,
operators, and tenders, synthetic and glass
fibres
516091 68 4 23040 0.1 28.9 60.6 10.5
Fabric and apparel patternmakers 516092 80 2 9650 0.0 28.9 60.6 10.5
Upholsterers 516093 57 7 41040 0.1 33.7 61.3 5.0
Textile, apparel, and furnishings workers,
all other
516099 75 5 24740 0.1 28.9 60.6 10.5
Cabinetmakers and bench carpenters 517011 57 20 121660 0.3 22.0 69.1 8.9
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Table A.1: (continued)
Occupation SOC Code Offshorability
index
Adjusted
Offshorability
index
Employment
Educational
attainment percent
distribution
Absolute Percent Low Medium High
Furniture finishers 517021 43 3 24610 0.1 28.4 61.8 9.8
Model makers, wood 517031 60 0 2280 0.0 19.6 65.8 14.6
Patternmakers, wood 517032 60 0 2000 0.0 19.6 65.8 14.6
Sawing machine setters, operators, and
tenders, wood
517041 57 10 60280 0.2 32.4 64.4 3.2
Woodworking machine setters, operators,
and tenders, except sawing
517042 57 15 94690 0.3 33.3 62.7 3.9
Woodworkers, all other 517099 57 2 10550 0.0 19.6 65.8 14.6
Stationary engineers and boiler operators 518021 55 7 43110 0.1 7.1 81.7 11.2
Chemical plant and system operators 518091 68 11 58640 0.2 7.9 83.5 8.6
Gas plant operators 518092 29 1 10530 0.0 7.9 83.5 8.6
Petroleum pump system operators,
refinery operators and gaugers
518093 29 3 40470 0.1 7.9 83.5 8.6
Plant and system operators, all other 518099 29 1 13920 0.0 7.9 83.5 8.6
Chemical equipment operators and
tenders
519011 68 10 50610 0.1 9.3 76.7 14.0
Separating, filtering, clarifying,
precipitating, and still machine setters,
operators, and tenders
519012 68 8 41250 0.1 9.3 76.7 14.0
Crushing, grinding, and polishing machine
setters, operators and tenders
519021 68 8 41480 0.1 24.9 69.9 5.1
Grinding and polishing workers, hand 519022 68 9 44890 0.1 24.9 69.9 5.1
Mixing and blending machine setters,
operators and tenders
519023 68 25 129440 0.4 24.9 69.9 5.1
Cutters and trimmers, hand 519031 69 6 28360 0.1 33.2 62.5 4.2
Cutting and slicing machine setters,
operators and tenders
519032 68 15 78030 0.2 33.2 62.5 4.2
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Table A.1: (continued)
Occupation SOC Code Offshorability
index
Adjusted
Offshorability
index
Employment
Educational
attainment percent
distribution
Absolute Percent Low Medium High
Extruding, forming, pressing, and
compacting machine setters, operators and
tenders
519041 68 15 80420 0.2 20.8 76.6 2.6
Furnace, kiln, oven, drier, and kettle
operators and tenders
519051 59 5 28140 0.1 14.1 78.8 7.1
Inspectors, testers, sorters, samplers, and
weighers
519061 60 86 506160 1.4 12.7 73.7 13.5
Jewellers and precious stone and metal
workers
519071 64 5 28100 0.1 19.3 63.3 17.4
Medical appliance technicians 519082 34 1 10810 0.0 6.8 78.7 14.5
Ophthalmic laboratory technicians 519083 34 3 26740 0.1 6.8 78.7 14.5
Packaging and filling machine operators
and tenders
519111 68 76 396270 1.1 37.3 58.6 4.1
Coating, painting, and spraying machine
setters, operators and tenders
519121 68 19 100830 0.3 27.1 68.8 4.0
Painters, transportation equipment 519122 68 10 52650 0.1 27.1 68.8 4.0
Painting, coating, and decorating workers 519123 68 5 27830 0.1 27.1 68.8 4.0
Photographic process workers 519131 34 3 28000 0.1 7.0 72.1 20.9
Photographic processing machine
operators
519132 48 7 53970 0.2 7.0 72.1 20.9
Semiconductor processors 519141 70 9 44720 0.1 23.6 71.1 5.3
Cementing and gluing machine operators
and tenders
519191 68 5 25650 0.1 24.1 74.5 1.4
Cleaning, washing, and metal pickling
equipment operators and tenders
519192 68 3 15250 0.0 22.7 73.7 3.5
Cooling and freezing equipment operators
and tenders
519193 68 2 9640 0.0 23.6 71.1 5.3
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Table A.1: (continued)
Occupation SOC Code Offshorability
index
Adjusted
Offshorability
index
Employment
Educational
attainment percent
distribution
Absolute Percent Low Medium High
Etchers and engravers 519194 68 2 10050 0.0 12.2 75.4 12.4
Moulders, shapers, and casters, except
metal and plastic
519195 69 8 41250 0.1 24.8 61.7 13.5
Paper goods machine setters, operators,
and tenders
519196 68 21 107560 0.3 18.4 78.4 3.2
Tyre builders 519197 69 4 19860 0.1 14.9 81.8 3.4
Helpers - production workers 519198 70 105 528610 1.5 33.5 60.2 6.3
Production workers, all other 519199 68 57 296340 0.8 23.6 71.1 5.3
First-line supervisors/managers of helpers,
labourers and material movers, hand
531021 28 14 176030 0.5 8.5 74.4 17.1
First-line supervisors/managers of
transportation and material-moving
machine and vehicle operators
531031 28 18 221520 0.6 8.5 74.4 17.1
Sailors and marine oilers 535011 34 3 31090 0.1 12.0 73.1 14.9
Ship engineers 535031 34 1 13240 0.0 12.0 73.1 14.9
Source: Blinder (2009a); Employment Projections Program, U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table 1.11 (bls_ep_table_111).
Notes: The adjusted offshoring index is defined by multiplying the offshoring index reported in (Blinder, 2009a, Appendix Table) by the employment
shares. Employment shares denote the percentage in total employment over the 290 occupations. Moreover, due to data availability we have com-
bined the occupational categories "Computer support specialists A" and "Computer support specialists B" reported in (Blinder, 2009a, Appendix
Table) into one item "Computer support specialist" (SOC code: 151041) and computed the offshorability index as the arithmetic average.
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B SupplementaryMathematical Appendix
In this section we elaborate the formal steps of equilibrium conditions and main results of the comparative static analysis.
B.1 Firm optimization problem
The optimization problem of a firm can be solved is two steps. For given task margins, a firm minimizes the unit costs of task production
by hiring the optimal amount of each domestic skill group and offshore workers. It then chooses the optimal task margins, which we
discuss in the next section. The Lagrangian to the cost minimization problem is defined as follows:
min
lj(i),ξ
L = wL
∫ IL
0
lL(i)di+ wM
∫
i∈IM
lM (i)di+ wO
∫
i∈IO
lO(i)di+ wH
∫ 1
IH
lH(i)di
+ξ
(
E −
[∫ IL
0
(ϕL(i)lL(i))
σ−1
σ di+
∫
i∈IM
lM (i)
σ−1
σ di+
∫
i∈IO
(
lO(i)
τζ(i)
)σ−1
σ
di
+
∫ 1
IH
(ϕH(i)lH(i))
σ−1
σ di
] σ
σ−1
 , (B.1)
where ξ is the Lagrangian multiplier and Ij denote the subset of tasks produced by labor type j ∈ {M,O}. The first-order conditions
w.r.t. lj(i), j = {L,M,H,O} are, respectively, given:
∂L
∂lL(i)
= wL − ξ
(
E
lL(i)
)1/σ
ϕL(i)
σ−1
σ = 0, (B.2)
∂L
∂lM (i)
= wM − ξ
(
E
lM (i)
)1/σ
= 0, (B.3)
∂L
∂lH(i)
= wH − ξ
(
E
lH(i)
)1/σ
ϕL(i)
σ−1
σ = 0, (B.4)
∂L
∂lO(i)
= wO − ξ
(
E
lO(i)
)1/σ
(τζ(i))
1−σ
σ = 0, (B.5)
∂L
∂ξ
= E −
∫ IL
0
(ϕL(i)lL(i))
σ−1
σ di+
∫
i∈IM
lM (i)
σ−1
σ di+
∫
i∈IO
(
lO(i)
τζ(i)
)σ−1
σ
di+
∫ 1
IH
(ϕH(i)lH(i))
σ−1
σ di
 σσ−1 = 0. (B.6)
Solving conditions (B.2)–(B.4) w.r.t. lj(i) for j ∈ {L,M,H,O} and inserting the results into condition (B.6), we get
ξ =
[∫ IL
0
ϕL(i)
σ−1diw1−σL + (IH − IL − IO)w1−σM +
∫
i∈IO
ζ(i)1−σdi(τwO)1−σ +
∫ 1
IH
ϕH(i)
1−σdiw1−σH
] 1
1−σ
, (B.7)
where we use IM ≡ IH − IL − IO .
By the envelope theorem, the marginal cost of task composite is denoted by the shadow price, i.e. ∂L
∂E
= ξ. Thus, under perfect
competition, the marginal cost must equal the price index of task composite, i.e. PE = ξ.
B.2 Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1.
Recall the marginal cost of the task composite (i.e. unit costs of task production) Eq. (B.7). Now the optimal choice of domestic task
margins, IL and IH , is obtained by minimizing ξ with respect to IL and IH , respectively:
dξ
dIL
=
1
1− σ ξ
σ
[
ϕL(IL)
σ−1w1−σL − w1−σM
]
, (B.8)
dξ
dIH
=
1
1− σ ξ
σ
[
w1−σM − ϕH(IH)σ−1w1−σH
]
. (B.9)
We then get that dξ
dIL
= 0 and dξ
dIH
= 0 if and only if conditions (4) and (5) in Lemma 1 hold, respectively. 
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Proof of Lemma 2.
The proof of Lemma 2 can be shown in two steps. First, we define the set and the extensive margins of offshoring tasks. Second, by
means of a positive monotonic transformation we derive the no-arbitrage conditions of offshoring task allocation in terms of the length
of offshoring interval.
Notice that by Assumption 1 the U-shaped functional form of the comparative advantage schedule, ζ(i), requires that the subset of
offshore task IO is defined by a closed set. Let I1 and I2 denote the boundaries of the offshore set such that I1 < I2, IO = {I1, I2}, and
IM = IH − IL − (I2 − I1). Then, the optimal choice of offshoring task margins, I1 and I2, is obtained by minimizing λwith respect to
I1 and I2, respectively:
dξ
dI1
=
1
1− σ ξ
σ
[
ζ(I1)
1−σ(τwO)1−σ − w1−σM
]
, (B.10)
dξ
dI2
=
1
1− σ ξ
σ
[
w1−σM − ζ(I2)1−σ(τwO)1−σ
]
. (B.11)
Recalling ω = 1/(τwO), it then follows that
dξ
dI1
= 0 and dξ
dI2
= 0 if and only if
wM =
ζ(I1)
ω
, (B.12)
wM =
ζ(I2)
ω
. (B.13)
However, it is useful to look at changes in the length of offshoring interval, i.e. IO = I2 − I1, indicating implicitly changes in the
extensive offshoring margins, I1 and I2. In fact, all we need to show is how offshoring-induced changes in the interval IO affects the
domestic skill-task margins, IL and IH . Let w˜ ≡ wMω and let the semi-elasticities at the extensive offshoring margins I1 and I2 be
given by ε1 = − ∂ ln ζ(I1)∂I1 > 0 and ε2 =
∂ ln ζ(I2)
∂I2
> 0, respectively. Next, taking logs in equations (B.12) and (B.13) and differentiating
totally these two equations together with IO = I2 − I1, we obtain
d ln w˜ = −ε1dI1,
d ln w˜ = ε2dI2,
dIO = dI2 − dI1.
Utilizing then the first two equations in the last one, yields
dIO = d ln w˜
(
1
ε2
+
1
ε1
)
.
It is convenient to define µ = ε2ε1
ε2+ε1
> 0, which is increasing in both arguments. Then, after further manipulation, we obtain d ln w˜ =
µdIO . This is a simple first-order linear homogeneous ordinary differential equation. Thus, by integration∫
d ln w˜di =
∫
µdIOdi,
we obtain a unique solution
wM =
ϕO(IO)
ω
, (B.14)
where ϕO(IO) = exp[µIO]. Equation (B.14) also implies that the unit offshore labor hired to produce a task i can be written as tO(i) =
lO(i)
τϕO(i)
, such that the first order condition (B.5) becomes
∂L
∂lO(i)
= wO − ξ
(
E
lO(i)
)1/σ
(τϕO(i))
1−σ
σ = 0, for i ∈ IO. (B.15)
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Proof of Lemma 3.
LetNj denote the endowment of each skill group j ∈ {L,M,H} in the home country. Then, the resource constraints must satisfy
NL =
∫ IL
0
lL(i)di, (B.16)
NM =
∫
i∈IM
lM (i)di, (B.17)
NH =
∫ 1
IH
lH(i)di, (B.18)
nO =
∫
i∈IO
lO(i)di. (B.19)
From the optimality conditions (B.2)–(B.4), a firm will allocate each skill group across the different range of tasks that satisfies
lL(i) = lL(i
′)
(
ϕL(i)
ϕL(i′)
)σ−1
, ∀i, i′ ∈ [0, IL], (B.20)
lM (i) = lM (i
′), ∀i, i′ ∈ IM = IH − IL − IO, (B.21)
lH(i) = lH(i
′)
(
ϕH(i)
ϕH(i′)
)σ−1
, ∀i, i′ ∈ [IH , 1], (B.22)
lO(i) = lO(i
′)
(
ϕO(i)
ϕO(i′)
)1−σ
, ∀i, i′ ∈ [I1, I2], (B.23)
where to derive equation (B.23) we made use of equation (B.15).
Thus, for the medium-skill labor it follows from (B.17) and (B.21) that a firm allocates an equal amount of workers across the range
of tasks
lM =
NM
IH − IL − IO
, ∀i ∈ IM . (B.24)
Note that for low-skill and high-skill workers as well as for offshore workers Eqs. (B.20), (B.22), and (B.23) imply lL(i) = lL(0)
(
ϕL(i)
ϕL(0)
)σ−1
for i ∈ [0, IL], lH(i) = lH(1)
(
ϕH (i)
ϕH (1)
)σ−1
for i ∈ [IH , 1], and lO(i) = lO(IO)
(
ϕO(i)
ϕO(IO)
)1−σ
for i ∈ IO , respectively. Utilizing these
expressions, respectively, into Eqs. (B.20), (B.22), and (B.23), manipulating and substituting back into the expressions for lL(i), lH(i),
and IO(i), we obtain
lL(i) =
ϕL(i)
σ−1
γL(IL)
NL, (B.25)
lH(i) =
ϕH(i)
σ−1
γH(IH)
NH , (B.26)
lO(i) =
ϕO(i)
1−σ
γO(IO)
nO, (B.27)
where γL(IL) =
∫ IL
0 ϕL(i)
σ−1di, γH(IH) =
∫ 1
IH
ϕH(i)
σ−1di, and γO(IO) =
∫
i∈IO ϕO(i)
1−σdi.
First, utilize equations (B.24)–(B.27), respectively, into the first order conditions (B.3), (B.2), (B.4), and (B.15). In addition, to obtain
the equilibrium values of the inverse labor demand conditions. Second, substituting the these results into the condition (B.6) we obtain
the equilibrium values of task composite derived in Lemma 3. 
Proof of Lemma 4.
The marginal costs of task composite is given by CE = λ. Substituting the no-arbitrage conditions (4) and (5) from Lemma 1 for wL
and wH , respectively, and (6) from Lemma 2 for ω in (B.7) and manipulating slightly, we obtain the equilibrium value of marginal costs
of task composite, Eq. (12). 
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Proof of Lemma 5.
To obtain the implicit equilibrium solution to the task margins, take first the ratio between inverse medium-skill labor demand and
inverse labor demand of other types of workers from Eqs. (7)–(10) in Lemma 3
wL
wM
=
(
NL
NM
)− 1
σ
(
γL(IL)
IH − IL − IO
) 1
σ
, (B.28)
wO
wM
=
(
nO
NM
)− 1
σ
τ
1−σ
σ
(
γO(IO)
IH − IL − IO
) 1
σ
, (B.29)
wM
wH
=
(
NM
NH
)− 1
σ
(
IH − IL − IO
γH(IH)
) 1
σ
. (B.30)
Notice that nO is endogenously chosen by the firm. Thus, to account for employment adjustments, recall equation (10) to get the labor
demand for offshoring workers:
nO = w
−σ
O τ
1−σγO(IO)PσEE.
Utilizing the demand for task production (2) and the equilibrium conditions from Lemmas 2 and 4 into the previously derived equation,
we obtain
nO = w
−σ
O τ
1−σγO(IO)P
σ−1/α
E B
= w−σO τ
1−σγO(IO) (Ω(·)wM )σ−1/α B
= τγO(IO)(Ω(·)ϕO(IO))σ−1/α(wOτ)−
1
α B (B.31)
Substituting (B.31) back into equation (B.29) and rearranging, we obtain
1
wM
= (Ω(·)ϕO(IO))
1
σα
−1(wOτ)
1
σα
−1B− 1σ
(
NM
IH − IL − IO
) 1
σ
. (B.29′)
Now, combining the equations (B.28) and (B.30) with the optimal domestic task allocation conditions (4) and (5) in Lemma 1,
respectively, and equation (B.29′) with the optimal offshoring condition (6) in Lemma 2 and rearranging slightly, we obtain the implicit
equilibrium solution (14) derived in Lemma 5. 
Proof of Proposition 1.
By Lemma 1 iii) and Lemma 2 ii), we assume that the values of wL, wM , and wH and the offshoring cost, ω, are sufficiently positive,
respectively, such that an interior solution for all task margins exists in equilibrium. For the uniqueness of the equilibrium task margins,
we evaluate the Jacobian of the implicit equilibrium solution (14). The comparative static analysis regarding changes in the task margins
implies total differentiation of (14) w.r.t. IL, IO , and IO , which can be written as
J =

(
ϕL(IL)
σ−1
γL(IL)
+ 1
IH−IL−IO + σεL
)
1
IH−IL−IO −
1
IH−IL−IO(
[1− σα] ΩL(·)
Ω(·) +
α
IH−IL−IO
) (
µ+ [1− σα] ΩO(·)
Ω(·) +
α
IH+IL−IO
) (
[1− σα] ΩH (·)
Ω(·) − αIH−IL−IO
)
− 1
IH−IL−IO −
1
IH−IL−IO
(
ϕH (IH )
σ−1
γH (IH )
+ 1
IH−IL−IO + σεH
)

(B.32)
where ΩL(·)/Ω(·) ≡ ∂Ω(·)∂IL /Ω(·) = −λLεL < 0, ΩO(·)/Ω(·) ≡
∂Ω(·)
∂IO
/Ω(·) = −λOµ < 0, ΩH(·)/Ω(·) ≡ ∂Ω(·)∂IH /Ω(·) = λHεH > 0, and
λL =
γL(IL)ϕL(IL)
1−σ
Ω(·)1−σ , λH =
γH (IH )ϕH (IH )
1−σ
Ω(·)1−σ , and λL =
γO(IO)ϕO(IO)
σ−1
Ω(·)1−σ denote the cost shares. Next for a sufficient degree of
complementarity between tasks, i.e. σ < 1/α, and a low offshoring cost shares, λO < 1/(1−σα), the diagonal elements of the Jacobian,
(B.32), are always positive.
By ?, sufficient conditions for global uniqueness require that Jacobian is aP -Matrix, i.e. its principle minors are positive. Computing
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the determinants of principle minors of the Jacobian we obtain
|J1×1| =
(
ϕL(IL)
σ−1
γL(IL)
+
1
IH − IL − IO
+ σεL
)
> 0. (B.33)
|J2×2| =
(
ϕL(IL)
σ−1
γL(IL)
+
1
IH − IL − IO
+ σεL
)
×
(
µ+ [1− σα] ΩO(·)
Ω(·) +
α
IH + IL − IO
)
−
(
[1− σα] ΩL(·)
Ω(·) +
α
IH − IL − IO
)
1
IH − IL − IO
=
(
ϕL(IL)
σ−1
γL(IL)
+
1
IH − IL − IO
+ σεL
)
× ((1− [1− σα]λO)µ)
+
α
IH + IL − IO
(
ϕL(IL)
σ−1
γL(IL)
+ σεL
)
+
(
[1− σα] λLεL
IL
)
1
IH − IL − IO
> 0. (B.34)
|J3×3| =
(
ϕL(IL)
σ−1
γL(IL)
+
1
IH − IL − IO
+ σεL
)
×
[(
µ+
[
1
α
− σ
]
ΩO(·)
Ω(·) +
α
IH + IL − IO
)
×
(
ϕH(IH)
σ−1
γH(IH)
+
1
IH − IL − IO
+ σεH
)
+
1
IH − IL − IO
(
[1− σα] ΩH(·)
Ω(·) −
α
IH − IL − IO
)]
− 1
IH − IL − IO
[(
[1− σα] ΩL(·)
Ω(·) +
α
IH − IL − IO
)
×
(
ϕH(IH)
σ−1
γH(IH)
+
1
IH − IL − IO
+ σεH
)
+
1
IH − IL − IO
(
[1− σα] ΩH(·)
Ω(·) −
α
IH − IL − IO
)]
− 1
IH − IL − IO
[
− 1
IH − IL − IO
(
[1− σα] ΩL(·)
Ω(·) +
α
IH − IL − IO
)
+
1
IH − IL − IO
(
µ+ [1− σα] ΩO(·)
Ω(·) +
α
IH + IL − IO
)]
Substituting the expressions for Ωj(·)/Ω(·) and manipulating further, we obtain
=
(
ϕL(IL)
σ−1
γL(IL)
+
1
IH − IL − IO
+ σεL
)
×
[
([1− [1− σα]λO]µ)×
(
ϕH(IH)
σ−1
γH(IH)
+ σεH
)]
+
(
ϕL(IL)
σ−1
γL(IL)
+ σεL
)
× ([1− [1− σα]λO]µ)
1
IH + IL − IO
+
(
ϕL(IL)
σ−1
γL(IL)
+ σεL
)
×
[
α
IH + IL − IO
(
ϕH(IH)
σ−1
γH(IH)
+ σεH
)
+
1
IH − IL − IO
(
[1− σα] λHεH
IH
)]
+
1
IH − IL − IO
(
[1− σα] λLεL
IL
)
×
(
ϕH(IH)
σ−1
γH(IH)
+ σεH
)
> 0. (B.35)

Proof of Proposition 2.
Total differentiation of the system (18) with respect to ω, yields
J× I = ω, (B.36)
where J is given by (B.32), I = {dIL, dIO, dIH} andω = {0, dω/ω, 0}.
Let |Jk| denote the replacement of kth column of |J| by the vector ω, and to ease the notation let sj ≡ γj(Ij)
ϕj(Ij)
σ−1 denote the task share of skill
group j ∈ {L,H}. Then applying Cramer’s Rule, the solution to (B.36) is
dIL
dω
=
|J1|
|J| = −
1
|J|
1
ω
1
IH − IL − IO
(
1
sH
+ σεH
)
< 0, (B.37)
dIO
dω
=
|J2|
|J| =
1
|J|
1
ω
[(
1
sL
+
1
IH − IL − IO
+ σεL
)(
1
sH
+ σεH
)
+
(
1
sL
+ σεL
)(
1
IH − IL − IO
)]
> 0, (B.38)
dIH
dω
=
|J3|
|J| =
1
|J|
1
ω
1
IH − IL − IO
(
1
sL
+ σεL
)
> 0. (B.39)
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Comparing (B.37) and (B.39) with (B.38), it can be readily shown that offshoring induces a contraction of the range of medium skill-intensive tasks, i.e.
∣∣∣∣dIOdω
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣dIHdω
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣dILdω
∣∣∣∣
Next comparing (B.37) with (B.39), we can show that the magnitude of changes in the domestic task margins, IL and IH , is determined by the degree of
comparative advantage, i.e.
∣∣∣∣dIHdω
∣∣∣∣ Q ∣∣∣∣dILdω
∣∣∣∣
⇔
(
1
sL
+ σεL
)
Q
(
1
sH
+ σεH
)
.

Proof of Lemma 6.
Total differentiation of Ω(·) with respect to offshoring costs ω yields
d ln Ω(·)
dω
=
(
λHεH
dIH
dω
− λLεL
dIL
dω
)
−
(
λOµ
dIO
dω
)
. (B.40)
Now substitute the results of the comparative statics (B.37)–(B.39) into the previous equation and rearrange to obtain
d ln Ω(·)
dω
=
1
|J|
1
ω
(
λHεH
1
IH − IL − IO
(
1
sL
+ σεL
)
+ λLεL
1
IH − IL − IO
(
1
sH
+ σεH
)
−λOµ
[(
1
sL
+
1
IH − IL − IO
+ σεL
)(
1
sH
+ σεH
)
+
(
1
sL
+ σεL
)(
1
IH − IL − IO
)])
.
We can derive sufficient conditions under which the sign of d ln Ω(·)dω is unambiguously determined. It follows
d ln Ω(·)
dω < 0 whenever
µ > max
{
λL
λO
εL,
λH
λO
εH
}
.

Proof of Proposition 3.
To derive the boundaries for the elasticity of task productivity schedules, recall (15)–(17) and in these equations substitute for d ln Ω(·)dω the result from
(B.40) to obtain
d lnwL
dω
=
(
α
sL
− (1− ασ)(1− λL)εL
)
dIL
dω
+ (1− ασ)λOµ
dIO
dω
− (1− ασ)λHεH
dIH
dω
, (B.41)
d lnwM
dω
=
(
(1− ασ)λLεL −
α
IH − IL − IO
)
dIL
dω
+
(
(1− ασ)λOµ−
α
IH − IL − IO
)
dIO
dω
+
(
α
IH − IL − IO
− (1− ασ)λHεH
)
dIH
dω
, (B.42)
d lnwH
dω
= (1− ασ)λLεL
dIL
dω
+ (1− ασ)λOµ
dIO
dω
−
(
α
sH
− (1− ασ)(1− λH)εH
)
dIH
dω
. (B.43)
From the first terms in (B.41) and (B.42), we get the lower and upper boundaries for εL, respectively. Similarly, from the third terms in (B.42) and (B.43),
we get the upper and lower boundaries for εH , respectively. Finally, from the second in (B.42) we obtain the lower boundary for µ. Notice also that by the
sufficient condition (19) in Lemma 6 the last two terms in (B.41) and the first two terms in (B.43) are positive. 
Proof of Lemma 7.
The optimization problem of the firm is similar to the perfect competition case discussed above, except that now a fraction of low-skill workers are unem-
ployed due to a sufficiently high minimum wage scheme. The optimization problem implies that a firm chooses the optimal amount of low-skill workers
to produce a task i given the minimum wage scheme. Then, the modified first-order condition yields
W¯ = ξ˜
(
E
lL(i)
) 1
σ
ϕL(i)
σ−1
σ , (B.44)
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where ξ˜ denotes the modified Lagrangian multiplier and is now given by
ξ˜ =
[∫ IL
0
ϕL(i)
σ−1
diW¯
1−σ
+ (IH − IL − IO)w1−σM +
∫
i∈IO
ζ(i)
1−σ
di(τwO)
1−σ
+
∫ 1
IH
ϕH(i)
1−σ
diw
1−σ
H
] 1
1−σ
. (B.45)
For the sake of notation, we use throughout this section the same equilibrium notations of variables as in the perfect competition scenario. Again the firm
decides on the optimal task threshold, determining the allocation of tasks between low-skill and medium-skill workers, so that x˜i is minimized, i.e.
dξ˜
dIL
=
1
1− σ ξ˜
σ
[
ϕL(IL)
σ−1
W¯
1−σ − w1−σM
]
.
It follows that dξ˜dIL
= 0 if and only if the following condition holds
wM =
W¯
ϕL(IL)
.
Next let the low-skill unemployment rate be given by uL = 1−nL/NL, where nL denotes the endogenous amount of low-skill employment, so that
the resource constraint must satisfy
∫ IL
0 lL(i)di = nL. To derive the equilibrium inverse low-skill labor demand, we follow the same steps as in the proof
of Lemma 3 and combine the adjusted resource constraint for low-skill labor with (B.44) to obtain
W¯ = PE
E
nL
1
σ
γL(IL)
1
σ .
To derive the adjusted implicit equilibrium solution to task margin IL, notice that we need to account for the endogenous low-skill employment nL
as in the offshoring case. Following the same formal steps as in the proof of Lemma 5 we obtain equation (22). 
Proof of Proposition 4.
Take the total differentiation of the adjusted implicit system equations (23) w.r.t. to W¯ , and rearrange to obtain
J˜× I = W¯ , (B.46)
where I = {dIL, dIO, dIH}, W¯ = {−dW¯/W, 0, 0}, and J˜ is given by
J˜ =

(
α
IH−IL−IO + (1− (1− ασ)λL) εL
)
−
(
(1− ασ)λOµ− αIH−IL−IO
)
−
(
α
IH−IL−IO − (1− ασ)λHεH
)
(
α
IH−IL−IO − (1− ασ)λLεL
) (
α
IH−IL−IO + (1− (1− ασ)λO)µ
)
−
(
α
IH−IL−IO − (1− ασ)λHεH
)
− 1IH−IL−IO −
1
IH−IL−IO
(
1
IH−IL−IO + σεH +
ϕ
σ−1
H
γH (IH )
)

(B.47)
where we utilized the following expressions: ΩL(·)/Ω(·) ≡ ∂Ω(·)∂IL /Ω(·) = −λLεL < 0, ΩO(·)/Ω(·) ≡
∂Ω(·)
∂IO
/Ω(·) = −λOµ < 0, ΩH(·) ≡
∂Ω(·)
∂IH
/Ω(·) = λHεH > 0, and the expressions for the cost sharesλL = γL(IL)ϕL(IL)
1−σ
Ω(·)1−σ ,λH =
γH (IH )ϕH (IH )
1−σ
Ω(·)1−σ , andλL =
γO(IO)ϕO(IO)
σ−1
Ω(·)1−σ .
Computing the determinant of the Jacobian (B.47), we show that by sufficient conditions in Proposition 3 and for εH > λL/λHεL the adjusted
Jacobian is a P -Matrix too:
∣∣∣J˜1×1∣∣∣ = ( α
IH − IL − IO
+ (1− (1− ασ)λL) εL
)
> 0,
∣∣∣J˜2×2∣∣∣ = ( α
IH − IL − IO
+ (1− (1− ασ)λL) εL
)
×
(
α
IH − IL − IO
+ (1− (1− ασ)λO)µ
)
+
(
(1− ασ)λOµ−
α
IH − IL − IO
)
×
(
α
IH − IL − IO
− (1− ασ)λLεL
)
> 0,
52
and
∣∣∣J˜3×3∣∣∣ = ( α
IH − IL − IO
− (1− ασ)λLεL
)(
σεH +
ϕσ−1H
γH(IH)
)
µ
+(1− ασ)
(
1
IH − IL − IO
)
µ (λHεH − λLεL)
+εL
(
α
IH − IL − IO
)(
σεH +
ϕσ−1H
γH(IH)
)
(B.48)
+εL ((1− (1− ασ)λO)µ)
(
1
IH − IL − IO
+ σεH +
ϕσ−1H
γH(IH)
)
+εL
(
1
IH − IL − IO
)
((1− ασ)λHεH) > 0
Given (B.49) and by Cramer’s Rule, the solution to the 3× 3 system (B.46) yields
dIL
dW¯
= − 1∣∣∣J˜∣∣∣ 1W¯
[(
α
IH − IL − IO
)(
σεH +
ϕσ−1H
γH(IH)
)
+ ((1− (1− ασ)λO)µ)
(
1
IH − IL − IO
+ σεH +
ϕσ−1H
γH(IH)
)
+
(
1
IH − IL − IO
)
((1− ασ)λHεH)
]
< 0
dIO
dW¯
=
1∣∣∣J˜∣∣∣ 1W¯
[(
α
IH − IL − IO
− (1− ασ)λLεL
)(
σεH +
ϕσ−1H
γH(IH)
)
+ (1− ασ)
(
1
IH − IL − IO
)
(λHεH − λLεL)
]
> 0
dIH
dW¯
= − 1∣∣∣J˜∣∣∣ 1W¯
(
1
IH − IL − IO
)
[((1− (1− ασ)λO)µ) + (1− ασ)λLεL] < 0.
Next we compute the impact of easier offshoring on the equilibrium task margins under the minimum-wage regime. In doing so, take the total
differentiation of the adjusted implicit system equations (B.49) w.r.t. to ω, and rearrange to obtain
J˜× I = ω, (B.49)
where I = {dIL, dIO, dIH},ω = {0, dω/ω, 0}, and J˜ is given by (B.47). Applying Cramer’s Rule, the solution to the system (B.49) yields
dIL
dω
= − 1∣∣∣J˜∣∣∣ 1ω
[(
(1− ασ)λOµ−
α
IH − IL − IO
)(
1
IH − IL − IO
+ σεH +
ϕσ−1H
γH(IH)
)
+
(
1
IH − IL − IO
)(
α
IH − IL − IO
− (1− ασ)λHεH
)]
< 0
dIO
dω
=
1∣∣∣J˜∣∣∣ 1ω
[(
α
IH − IL − IO
+ (1− (1− ασ)λL) εL
)(
1
IH − IL − IO
+ σεH +
ϕσ−1H
γH(IH)
)
+
(
α
IH − IL − IO
)(
σεH +
ϕσ−1H
γH(IH)
)
+
(
1
IH − IL − IO
)
((1− ασ)λHεH)
]
> 0
dIH
dω
=
1∣∣∣J˜∣∣∣ 1ω
(
1
IH − IL − IO
)[(
α
IH − IL − IO
+ (1− (1− ασ)λL) εL
)
+
(
(1− ασ)λOµ−
α
IH − IL − IO
)]
> 0.

Proof of Proposition 5.
Inserting in equation (24) the solution from equation (B.40), we obtain
d lnnL
dω
=
1
α
(
α
sL
− (1− ασ)(1− λL)εL
)
dIL
dω
− 1
α
(1− ασ)λHεH
dIH
dω
−
(
λOµ
dIO
dω
)
It follows that easier offshoring will reduce the low-skill unemployment rate, i.e. d lnnLdω > 0, if and only if Lemma 6 and Proposition 3 hold. 
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Proof of Lemma 8.
As in minimum wage scenario, the resource constraint for low-skill labor is given by
∫ IL
0 lL(i)di = nL. Then, recalling the first-order condition (B.2) and
following similar formal steps as in the proof of Lemma 3, we obtain
wL = PE
(
E
nL
) 1
σ
γL(IL)
1
σ . (B.50)
Next, utilize the demand condition (3) to substitute forE and combine the equilibrium conditions (4), (12) and (13) to substitute forPE in equation (B.50).
Rearranging slightly and substituting uL = 1− nL/NL for nL, we obtain equation (26).
To the derive the adjusted implicit solution (27), take first the ration between (8) and (B.50) to obtain
wL
wM
=
(
NM
nL
) 1
σ
(
γL(IL)
IH − IL − IO
) 1
σ
.
Then, utilizing equilibrium condition (4) and substituting uL = 1− nL/NL for nL, we get (27).
Finally, from equations (25) and (26) we obtain the market-clearing condition (28). 
Proof of Proposition 6.
Taking the total differentiation of the system of equations (29) w.r.t. to ω and rearranging, yields
Jˆ× Iˆ = ωˆ, (B.51)
where Iˆ = {dIL, dIO, dIH , duL}, ωˆ = {0, 0, dω/ω, 0}, and Jˆ is given by
Jˆ =

(
[1 − ασ] (1 − λL) εL − αsL
)
−(1 − ασ)λOµ (1 − ασ)λHεH −
(
α
1−uL
+ δ
)
(
1
sL
+ 1
IH−IL−IO
+ σεL
)
1
IH−IL−IO
− 1
IH−IL−IO
1
1−uL(
α
IH−IL−IO
− [1 − σα]λLεL
) (
(1 − [1 − σα]λO)µ + αIH+IL−IO
) (
[1 − σα]λHεH − αIH−IL−IO
)
0
− 1
IH−IL−IO
− 1
IH−IL−IO
(
1
sH
+ 1
IH−IL−IO
+ σεH
)
0

, (B.52)
where we utilized the following definitions: 1sL
=
ϕL(IL)
σ−1
γL(IL)
, 1sH
=
ϕH (IH )
σ−1
γH (IH )
, ΩL(·)/Ω(·) ≡ ∂Ω(·)∂IL /Ω(·) = −λLεL < 0, ΩO(·)/Ω(·) ≡
∂Ω(·)
∂IO
/Ω(·) = −λOµ < 0, ΩH(·)/Ω(·) ≡ ∂Ω(·)∂IH /Ω(·) = λHεH > 0, and the expressions for the cost shares λL =
γL(IL)ϕL(IL)
1−σ
Ω(·)1−σ , λH =
γH (IH )ϕH (IH )
1−σ
Ω(·)1−σ , and λL =
γO(IO)ϕO(IO)
σ−1
Ω(·)1−σ .
Computing the determinant of the Jacobian (B.52), we show that by sufficient conditions in Proposition 3 the adjusted Jacobian Jˆ is a P -Matrix too:
∣∣∣Jˆ1×1∣∣∣ = ([1− ασ] (1− λL) εL − α
sL
)
> 0,
∣∣∣Jˆ2×2∣∣∣ = ([1− ασ] (1− λL) εL − α
sL
)
× 1
IH − IL − IO
+ (1− ασ)λOµ
(
1
sL
+
1
IH − IL − IO
+ σεL
)
> 0,
∣∣∣Jˆ3×3∣∣∣ = ([1− ασ] (1− λL) εL − α
sL
)(
1
IH − IL − IO
)
([1− σα]λHεH + (1− [1− σα]λO)µ)
+(1− ασ)λOµ
((
1
sL
+
1
IH − IL − IO
+ σεL
)
×
(
[1− σα]λHεH −
α
IH − IL − IO
)
+
1
IH − IL − IO
(
α
IH − IL − IO
− [1− σα]λLεL
))
(1− ασ)λHεH
((
1
sL
+
1
IH − IL − IO
+ σεL
)
×
(
(1− [1− σα]λO)µ+
α
IH + IL − IO
)
− 1
IH − IL − IO
(
α
IH − IL − IO
− [1− σα]λLεL
))
> 0.
To compute the determinant of the Jacobian (B.52), we apply the cofactor expansion along the 1st row, i.e.
∣∣∣Jˆ4×4∣∣∣ = Σ4q=1a1q Jˆ1q , where Jˆ1q is the
54
cofactor of the element a1q . Formally,
∣∣∣Jˆ4×4∣∣∣ = ([1− ασ] (1− λL) εL − α
sL
)
Jˆ11 + (1− ασ)λOµJˆ12 + (1− ασ)λHεH Jˆ13 +
(
α
1− uL
+ δ
)
Jˆ14 > 0, (B.53)
where
Jˆ11 =
1
1 − uL
((
(1 − [1 − σα]λO)µ +
α
IH + IL − IO
)
×
(
1
sH
+
1
IH − IL − IO
+ σεH
)
+
1
IH − IL − IO
(
[1 − σα]λHεH −
α
IH − IL − IO
))
> 0,
Jˆ12 =
1
1 − uL
((
α
IH − IL − IO
− [1 − σα]λLεL
)
×
(
1
sH
+
1
IH − IL − IO
+ σεH
)
+
1
IH − IL − IO
(
[1 − σα]λHεH −
α
IH − IL − IO
))
> 0,
Jˆ13 =
1
1 − uL
(
1
IH − IL − IO
)((
(1 − [1 − σα]λO)µ +
α
IH + IL − IO
)
−
(
α
IH − IL − IO
− [1 − σα]λLεL
))
> 0,
and finally from (B.49) it follows Jˆ14 > 0.
Now using Cramer’s Rule we obtain the solution for the four variables.
dIL
dω
= − 1∣∣∣Jˆ∣∣∣
[
α(1 + sHσεH) + (1 + sHσεH)
(
(1− uL)δ − µλO(1− ασ)
[
sH + (IH − IL − IO)
])
+ (1− ασ)sHλHεH
]
ωsH (1− uL) (IH − IL − IO)
≶ 0,
⇒ dIL
dω
< 0, for (1− uL)δ > µλO(1− ασ)[sH + (IH − IL − IO)],
dIO
dω
=
1∣∣∣Jˆ∣∣∣ 1ωsHsL (1− uL) (IH + IL + IO) 2(
sH + (1 + sHσH) (IH + IL + IO)
)[
(IH − IL − IO) ((1− ασ) (1− λL) sLεL − α)
+ (α+ (1− uL)δ) (1 + sLσL) (IH − IL − IO)
]
+ sHsL(1− ασ)λHH (IH − IL − IO)
+ (α+ (1− uL)δ) sL(1 + sHσH) (IH + IL + IO) > 0,
dIH
dω
=
1∣∣∣Jˆ∣∣∣
[
sL ((1− ασ) ((1− λL)L + µλO) + ασεL) + (1− uL) (δ + δsLσεL)
]
ωsL (1− uL) (IH − IL − IO)
> 0,
duL
dω
= − 1∣∣∣Jˆ∣∣∣ 1ωsHsL (IH − IL − IO)[
(1− ασ)sH(λHεH − λOµ) + (1 + sHσεH)[(1− ασ)µλO (IH − IL − IO)− α]
+(1− ασ)sL
(
(1 + sHσεH)µλO(1 + σεL (IH − IL − IO)) + (1 + (1− λH)σsHεH)(1− λL)εL + σεLsHλOµ
)]
< 0.
The impact of easier offshoring on real wages of medium-skill and high-skill workers can be computed following the steps in the Proof of Proposition
3, while derivation of the impact of offshoring on low-sill real wages requires further steps, which we discuss below.
Recall equations (25) and (26). Taking logs and differentiating totally with respect to ω we obtain respectively
dwL
dω
= −δ duL
dω
(B.54)
dwL
dω
= −∆ dIL
dω
− (1− ασ) dΩ(·)
dω
+
α
1− uL
duL
dω
, (B.55)
where for convenience ∆ ≡
(
(1− ασ)εL − αsL
)
and by Proposition 3 ∆ > 0. Solving equation (B.55) for duLdω and substituting it in equation (B.54)
and rearranging, we get
dwL
dω
= − (1− uL)δ
α+ (1− uL)δ
(
∆
dIL
dω
+ (1− ασ) dΩ(·)
dω
)
. (B.56)
By Proposition 3 and for δ > µ
λO(1−ασ)[sH+(IH−Il−IO)]
1−uL , it follows
dIL
dω < 0 and
d ln Ω(·)
dω < 0.Thus, from equation (B.56)
dwL
dω > 0. 
